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Preface
This thesis is a collection of three separate papers. Chapter 3 is based on joint
work with Marc Blatter.
Although the whole thesis consists of theoretical essays in Industrial Organiza-
tion, regarding their content the three chapters are quite heterogeneous: Chap-
ter 1 is on quality and price discrimination; Chapter 2 discusses job markets
with posted salaries; and Chapter 3 analyzes exclusivity agreements in upstream
markets.
Nevertheless, all chapters seek answers to the same broad set of questions: How
do firms set prices when their pricing decisions affect the composition of their
demand? Moreover: What is the resulting allocation of buyers once all firms
use prices as selection devices? This second question is of particular relevance
when it comes to the evaluation of market outcomes and policy measures. From
a Utilitarian point of view, prices themselves are irrelevant. Each dollar spent
by a buyer ends up in the pocket of a seller. If, however, prices are such that
a transaction does not take place at all, although the willingness-to-pay ex-
ceeds the marginal cost of production, the welfare implications are detrimental.
Furthermore, even if all customers end up buying, their allocation may be inef-
ficient. That is, there could exist another allocation where the sum of consumer
surplus and producer surplus is higher than in the market equilibrium.
To reach such conclusions, it is essential to allow for settings where firms are
able to set prices. As we discuss in the following, this does not require that firms
have monopoly power. The presence of transportation cost (Chapter 1), asym-
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metrical information (Chapter 2), or additional means of competition (Chapter
3) provides firms with sufficient degrees of freedom. Of course, the existence
of competitors (a feature of all our settings) limits their price-setting power:
By defining the buyers’ outside opportunities, competitors set the benchmark
on how much a firm can charge. But beyond this, the customers’ and trading
partners’ willingness-to-pay can also be affected by instruments under control
of the firm. By selling products in qualitatively different varieties, for instance,
a firm influences the goodness of fit between its customers’ preferences and the
products it sells. Or in a labor market, by refusing to hire applicants in the
wake of an unpromising job talk, an employer can raise the salary it promises
ex ante. Eventually, in the market for an intermediate good, by asking for ex-
clusivity in a trade relationship, a retailer may obtain a better position in the
downstream market, which in turn allows it to offer higher wholesale prices.
Once we know how firms set their prices, we are able to investigate equilibrium
allocations: Who buys what? Who buys at all? And how much will be sold? We
can distinguish between welfare levels of varying customer types, and we can
compare the consumer surplus under varying assumptions about the market
structure. We are also able to assess the profitability of a firm’s business,
depending on the cost of production and the state of the industry. Above all,
we can evaluate the impact of policy measures on each of these dimensions.
Who gains? Who loses? Is there scope for a Pareto improvement? Are there
unintended collateral effects?
Before addressing these questions formally, we briefly discuss the models of each
chapter separately. Again, we focus on the following questions: How do firms
exert market power by setting prices, even in the presence of competitors? What
impact have prices on the selection of customers and trading partners? How
does the selection process shape the equilibrium allocation? And what benefits
and side effects do policy interventions entail?
In Chapter 1, we consider a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-
quality and a low-quality product. Customers differ with respect to their brand
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preferences and their attitudes towards quality. The standard result in the
literature (Armstrong and Vickers, 2001; Rochet and Stole, 2002) is that firms
add identical markups on their marginal cost of production, independently of
the quality of the product. That is, their ability to set prices above marginal
cost is completely determined by the degree of horizontal differentiation.
We show that this result crucially depends on the assumption that the cus-
tomers’ valuation of quality is identical across firms. We argue that the disu-
tility from consuming a low-quality product rather than a high-quality product
can be firm-specific. For instance, a low-quality “no-name” substitute may dif-
fer from a trademark brand in various vertical dimensions, such as performance,
durability, product safety, conditions of production, quality of ingredients, ease
of operation, and eco-friendliness. Since consumers are heterogeneous as well,
it is possible that a customer who prefers the high-quality product at one firm
prefers the low-quality version at the other firm. Hence, even when the price
differentials between qualitatively varying products are identical across firms,
high-quality and low-quality goods are in direct competition.
We analyze the firms’ incentives in such settings. If, for example, quality entails
a firm-specific increase in utility, all consumers who buy a high-quality product
obtain a firm-specific consumer rent. In equilibrium, this is true regarding all
firms, but only regarding high-quality products. Accordingly, each firm has
an incentive to increase the markup on its high-quality product, where it has
relatively many captive (that is, infra-marginal) consumers. As a result, the
self-selection of the customers will be biased towards low-quality products.
In theory, this admits a thought about policy intervention. However, dictating
the terms of sale seems inappropriate. Nevertheless, we are able to identify
situations where the firms’ incentives to produce at lower cost are twisted. For
instance, we show that in a setting that describes the retail industry, firms
may actually benefit from (commonly) higher wholesale prices. Thus it can be
necessary that the government enforces lower import prices.
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In Chapter 2, we study the relation between prices and selection in greater
detail. Here, prices appear as salary offers, which employers announce publicly.
Although committing to the level of their remuneration, firms are not obliged
to accept each candidate. Depending on the offered salary and the supposed
composition of its applicants, a firm can adjust the standard its sets in a selec-
tion process like a job talk. The lower the promised salary, the more candidates
a firm accepts.
By announcing salary offers, however, firms may also screen the pool of ap-
plicants. We show that, to attract productive candidates, the promised salary
needs to be relatively high. Screening, in turn, has repercussions on a firm’s
hiring decision. If an employer knows that most of its applicants are highly
productive, it tends to discount bad job-talk performances. Poor outcomes are
conceived as the result of bad luck. Thus the hiring threshold is low, unless the
announced salary is excessively high.
Unfortunately, this is what happens in equilibrium. Applicants know that firms
screen them for productive types. They can therefore signal their ability by
approaching employers with high salaries and correspondingly low employment
probabilities. If, contrary to expectations, a candidate headed to a low-paying
firm, he or she would be identified as being of the unproductive type.
We rationalize this formation of beliefs by means of a game-theoretic refinement
criterion (D1 by Banks and Sobel, 1987). The intuition behind it, however, is
simple. No matter how employers interpret the signal a candidate conveys by
approaching a particular firm: Whenever it is favorable for productive appli-
cants to accept a lower salary in exchange for a higher employment probability,
the same applies for unproductive applicants as well. This is not true the other
way around.
The disregarding of low-paying firms on behalf of the candidates ignites a race
for high salary offers at the outset. Thereupon, as a consequence of the pooling
of productive and unproductive applicants at high-paying employers, hiring
thresholds will be exceedingly high. As a consequence, employment probabilities
Preface xiii
are undesirably low, both in the eyes of employers (who end up with many
vacancies) and the applicants (who stay with their outside opportunities).
One is drawn to the conclusion that salary ceilings may remedy this detrimen-
tal outcome. At least abstracting from international competition, employers
would benefit from lower salaries, too. The fact that in practice firms oppose
salary ceilings, however, indicates that globalized markets may indeed limit the
benefits of such policies. Like the employers in our single-market model, gov-
ernments trying to maximize national welfare might play a Prisoners’ Dilemma
as well by not stepping in.
In Chapter 3, we increase the number of instruments which a firm can use
for screening. Specifically, we discuss a setting where retailers and suppliers
compete for each other, not only by announcing wholesale prices and quantities,
but also by employing exclusivity clauses. Although we discuss how retailers
may select low-cost suppliers by offering to purchase higher quantities at lower
wholesale prices, screening itself is not at the center of our attention. Rather,
we focus on the effect exclusivity clauses have on competition.
In one of our main settings, retailers benefit from having suppliers which do
not sell to competing retailers. The absence of alternative sales channels for the
suppliers’ products limits competition in the downstream market. This results
in higher profits of the retailers. Thus there are incentives for retailers to impose
exclusivity clauses.
However, exclusivity clauses also intensify the competition for suppliers. Once
all retailers ask for exclusivity, each supplier has to choose a single retailer.
Thus each retailer has to offer a transfer as high as possible just to be taken
into consideration. The tough competition between the retailers forces them to
extract as much consumer surplus as possible in the downstream market and
redirect it to the suppliers. That is, exclusivity clauses strengthen competition,
but competition for the suppliers, at the expense of final customers.
Unlike our models in the previous chapters, in the presence of exclusivity clauses,
(wholesale) prices cannot be used to screen the market for productive trading
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partners. On the contrary, the competition-enhancing characteristic of exclusiv-
ity clauses completely deprives the retailers of their market power. Nevertheless,
the market outcome is again inefficient. We show that policy makers are able to
increase welfare by banning exclusivity clauses. (To be more precise, we iden-
tify circumstances where a ban on exclusivity clauses is beneficial, and compare
them with others where banning exclusivity is counterproductive.)
By comparing the results of Chapters 1 and 2 with the ones of Chapter 3,
it is interesting to note the impact of market imperfections on welfare. In
the first two chapters, informational frictions are present. For instance, if, in
contrast to our framework of the market-segmentation model (Chapter 1), firms
were able to charge prices as functions of individual customers’ preferences, the
outcome would be completely competitive. Firm would not lose their infra-
marginal customers by reducing prices at the margin. In our setting, it is the
informational asymmetry between customers and firms which results in higher
profits, but also in a distorted allocation.
In our salary-posting model (Chapter 2), market imperfections have adverse
welfare consequences, too. In the first place, employers do not observe their
applicants’ productivity types, but doing so would be sufficient to guarantee
a first-best allocation. Furthermore, they lack instruments to internalize their
candidates’ tradeoff between salaries and employment probabilities. If the firms
could tie their announced salaries to the performance required to pass a job
talk, competition for productive and unproductive applicants would be decou-
pled. Productive candidates could still fail due to bad luck, but the resulting
equilibrium would be second-best.
In our model on exclusivity clauses (Chapter 3), information is symmetric, and
competitive instruments are available. Nevertheless, the supply chain (consist-
ing of suppliers and retailers) turns out to behave like a vertically integrated
monopolist. Thus here we reach an inefficient outcome in a competitive setting,
without imposing informational asymmetries. This raises the question whether
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it is not necessarily imperfections which drive markets to fail. May there be
inefficiencies even in the absence of frictions?
Drawing such a conclusion from Chapter 3 would be wrong. From the first
fundamental theorem of welfare economics, we know that there must be a source
of imperfection whenever market allocations are inefficient. In our exclusivity-
clauses model, the mechanism which impairs efficiency is hidden in the imposed
sequence of events. Once suppliers are not restricted to sell their product via
the retail channel, competition for consumers is regained.
As a bottom line, we conclude that to evaluate the functioning of markets it is
insufficient to merely focus on the sum of individual interactions. They cannot
be analyzed in isolation. Rather, to adequately assess market outcomes and
policy measures, it is important to take into account industrial structures as a
whole.
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Chapter 1
Competitive Market
Segmentation
1.1 Introduction
One of the common findings of the literature on horizontal and vertical market
segmentation are quality-independent markups: differences in costs are trans-
lated one-to-one into differences in prices.1 This result stands in stark contrast
to observed empirical patterns.
For example, Barsky et al. (2003) use scanner data from one of the largest
Chicago area supermarket chains to estimate markup ratios between low-quality
“no-name” products and high-quality “national brands”.2 Consistently across
19 product categories, they find higher markups on low-quality products than
on high-quality products, with estimated ratios ranging from 1.14 (for canned
tuna) up to 2.33 (for toothbrushes). This result is mirrored elsewhere, as in
1For comprehensive surveys on the topic, see Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2007).
2More precisely, they compute lower bounds on these markup ratios, as marginal cost is
not observed.
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the study of Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) who generically find that
retailers “can earn greater net profit[s] from selling the store brands.”3
In other cases, markups on high-quality products are systematically higher.
For the automobile industry, Verboven (1999) provides empirical evidence that
premium products have larger absolute markups than base products. Similarly,
Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck (2000) estimate the average dealer margin for
premium gasoline to be almost 60 percent higher than the average margin for
regular gasoline. For the hardware industry, Deltas, Stengos, and Zacharias
(2011) show that markups on flagship computers are substantially higher than
markups on slower and older machines.
These contrasting examples provide reason for the following conjecture: When
the firms’ high-quality products are identical, and their respective lower-quality
versions differ from each other (such as in retailing), markups on low-quality
products tend to be higher. On the other hand, when competitors offer baseline
products which are similar, but their premium versions stand out from each
other (such as in the automobile industry), high-quality products are seemingly
the better deal for firms.
In the present chapter, we provide a theory which is in line with this pattern.
Contrary to existing theoretical work in this field, we do not assume that a
buyer’s difference in utility between consuming a high-quality product and a
low-quality product is constant across firms.4
Existing theories on the subject usually draw on the sequential revelation of in-
formation in order to explain quality-related differences in markups. Verboven
3Analogous results appear, for instance, in Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song (2002) and
Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004), where markups on store brands are higher than markups
on national brands in 17 of 18 categories. Regarding the music industry, Rabinovich, Maltz,
and Sinha (2008) show (among other things) that markups are lower on more popular CDs.
4Stole (1995), who separately analyzes horizontal and vertical second-degree price differen-
tiation in oligopolistic markets, states that “vertical preferences [. . . ] are harmonious across
firms – a customer with a high marginal valuation of quality for one firm will have similar
preferences for other firms as well; all firms prefer these customers.” While we agree that qual-
ity enters utility in a monotonous fashion, we oppose the idea of “harmonious” preferences.
Marginal utility may differ from firm to firm.
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(1999) and Ellison (2005), for instance, consider “add-on pricing games” where
only prices of low-quality products are publicly accessible. The differences be-
tween low-quality and high-quality products are interpreted as “add-ons”, which
provide additional utility if consumed together with the base good. Such a struc-
ture allows firms to sell add-ons at the monopoly price, a result which follows
from Diamond’s (1971) influential paper on price adjustment under learning
cost. This, in turn, explains higher markups on premium versions of a product.
Such models are certainly relevant concerning questions revolving around two-
part tariffs, hidden costs, and the like. In the above examples, however, it is
hard to argue that there exists an informational asymmetry between prices of
high-quality products and prices of low-quality products. We should, therefore,
consider a static “standard pricing game”.
Another strand of literature (Armstrong and Vickers, 2001; Rochet and Stole,
2002; Yang and Ye, 2008) studies such “one-shot” models. Unfortunately, for
general specifications of demand and cost, these models can only be solved
numerically. Under similar assumptions as in the present chapter, however,
closed-form solutions are available: In a symmetric equilibrium with fully cov-
ered markets, prices are cost-plus-fixed-fee, which implies that markups are
quality-independent. Verboven (1999), who considers a discrete-choice version
of this model, obtains the same result, which he calls “somewhat surprising”. In
the following, we argue that this finding is actually the result of the fact that
in all of these models, the firms basically play two separate competition-on-a-
line games à la Hotelling (1929).5 By considering alternative distributions of
preferences, we investigate departures from this outcome.
5A notable exception is Bonatti (2011), who integrates brand-specific preferences in a
model of competitive market segmentation. In a similar way as Armstrong and Vickers
(2001), Rochet and Stole (2002), and Yang and Ye (2008), he allows firms to simultane-
ously pick quality levels and prices. He obtains a “no distortion at the top” outcome. In
the present chapter, we consider quality levels as given. This enhances the tractability of
the model. Accordingly, we can include horizontal differentiation and (more importantly)
explicitly approximate customer prices in the case of uniformly distributed preferences.
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In our model, we also describe horizontal differentiation by use of the con-
ventional Hotelling framework. Our novelty concerns the characterization of
vertical preferences. We assume the disutility from consuming a low-quality
product rather than a high-quality product to be firm-specific.6 As an illustra-
tion, consider the case of two retailing firms which both sell a popular brand
of a product as well as their respective “no-name” substitutes. The no-name
products may differ from the trademark brand in various dimensions, many of
which may be called “vertical”: technical sophistication, conditions of produc-
tion, product safety, quality of ingredients, ease of operation, eco-friendliness,
durability, and performance are just a few that come to mind. Similarly, con-
sumers are heterogenous as well: Whereas a “gourmet” primarily cares about
the sophistication of a meal, a “gourmand” puts more emphasis on its size. In
a nutshell, it is possible that the difference between a customer’s willingness-to-
pay for the two qualities varies from firm to firm; but the sign and magnitude
of this difference also varies among customers.
Taking the customers’ preferences as given, we look at two firms, each selling a
high-quality product and a low-quality product. If the customers’ preferences
for quality are identical across the firms – an instance which we consider as
a special case – the firms essentially play two separate Hotelling games: The
disutility which a costumer incurs when buying the low-quality product at firm
A is the same as it would be at firm B. Thus, alongside the vertical dimension,
the firms are in a Bertrand-like situation. In this case, horizontal differentiation
remains as the single source of market power, and equilibrium markups are
unaffected by vertical preferences.
By contrast, if the customers’ vertical preferences are firm-specific, a funda-
mental asymmetry comes into play: On the one hand, a customer who buys the
6Instead of a firm-specific disutility, we could think of an additional utility which arises
from consuming high-quality products. Think of the airline industry, where economy-class
compartments are similar across many carriers. Regarding the business class or the first class,
one airline focusses on wider seats, whereas another airline serves better food or offers a more
up-to-date entertainment system. As we show in the final section of this chapter, such a
setting tends to induce higher markups on high-quality products.
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high-quality product has a constant willingness to pay, regardless of whether
his or her vertical disutility (which would be incurred by consuming the low-
quality product) assumes a low or a high value. On the other hand, a customer
who buys the low-quality product has a higher willingness to pay the less the
qualitative difference between the two varieties affects his or her utility. That
is, the lower the realization of the vertical disutility at firm A, the likelier
it becomes that even a B-affine customer starts buying the low-quality prod-
uct at A. Thus, metaphorically speaking, we show that both firms are able
to catch low-quality customers out of their competitor’s pond. Accordingly,
each firm’s low-quality-product customer base becomes to some extent inflated.
Usual marginal-versus-infra-marginal-consumers considerations then imply that
the firms set higher prices for their lower-quality products.
We organize the remainder of this chapter as follows. In Section 1.2 we set up
a model of spatial competition with two exogenously given qualities. We al-
low for general distributions, including firm-dependent vertical preferences. As
we show in Section 1.3, the equilibrium relation between markups and quality
depends on the distribution of customers. This contrasts with the earlier contri-
butions, but is too general as a result to gain additional insights. Therefore, in
the following sections we look at prototypical cases where the customers’ taste
parameters are uniformly distributed. In Section 1.4, we impose the standard
assumption of perfectly correlated vertical preferences. This leads to quality-
independent markups. In Section 1.5, we put this result into perspective by
looking at independently and identically distributed taste parameters. In the
case of homogenous high-quality products (abstracting form horizontal prefer-
ences), we find higher markups on low-quality products. This result is reversed
once we assume that low-quality products are vertically the same, and addi-
tional benefits from consuming high-quality products are specific to the firm,
as we exemplify in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes. Parts of the proofs are
relegated to the appendix.
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1.2 Model
Following the standard procedure in the literature, we consider a Hotelling
model of horizontal differentiation which we augment by a vertical component.
Two profit-maximizing firms, A and B, both offer a low-quality product L and
a high-quality product H.7 For each firm i ∈ {A,B}, we denote i’s prices for L
and H by piL and piH . The constant marginal cost of production is cL for L and
cH for H. Thus it is the same across firms but generally varies with quality. It
is natural to assume that cH ≥ cL ≥ 0.
There is a continuous unit mass of consumers, each of which is described by
a triplet d = (d, dAL , dBL ) ∈ [0, 1]3. d is the conventional (horizontal) taste
parameter, whereas diL reflects the reduction of a consumer’s willingness to pay
if he or she buys L instead of H at i. For the moment, we leave it open whether
dAL = dBL or not. Each consumer buys only one product at only one firm. If
opting for firm i, the utility of consumer d is
ui(d) =
v − p
i
H − tdi if qiH = 1
v − piL − tdi − tLdiL if qiL = 1,
(1)
where di = d if i = A and di = 1 − d if i = B. t and tL are weighting
parameters which measure the relative importance of the horizontal and vertical
differentiation.8 We assume v, the base utility of both versions of the product,
to be sufficiently high, such that each consumer ends up buying either L or
H. Accordingly, we do not have to make any assumptions on a consumer’s
reservation value. Furthermore, we impose cH − cL ≤ tL, an assumption which
ensures interior equilibria.
7In the following, everything which holds for A automatically translates to B, as we assume
the firms to be symmetric.
8Hence horizontal preferences are continuously distributed in the compact set [0, t], and
vertical preferences are continuously distributed in the compact set [0, tL].
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Based on (1), we can subdivide the decision of an individual consumer into two
parts. First, the consumer chooses firm A if and only if
v −min{pAH , pAL + tLdAL} − td ≥ v −min{pBH , pBL + tLdBL} − t(1− d). (2)
Given condition (2), the consumer prefers L over H if and only if
pAL + tLdAL ≤ pAH . (3)
In analyzing the model, we will look at symmetric subgame-perfect Nash-
equilibria for the “pricing game” where each firm i chooses prices piL and piH
and consumers subsequently buy their preferred product. These equilibria may
or may not involve the selling of both qualities. However, whenever firm i sells
both L and H in a (putative) equilibrium, we know from (3) that
0 ≤ xi := (piH − piL)/tL < 1. (4)
That is, by defining xi as the threshold value above which diL must lie in order
to buy H at i, we know that xi is located between 0 and 1 in an interior
equilibrium.
In the following sections, the structure of the firms’ objective functions is gener-
ally subject to the relation between prices. Therefore, as long as a firm chooses
to remain within an interior symmetric equilibrium, we impose (4) (as well
as symmetric prices) in order to construct a firm’s objective function. It is
clear, however, that these relations can never be used strategically: each firm
optimizes with respect to its own prices only.
In Section 1.3, we derive optimality conditions for arbitrary distributions of
(d, dAL , dBL ) and show that, in general symmetric interior equilibria, markups
on H and L are not the same but depend on the particular distribution. To
illustrate this, Section 1.4 and Section 1.5 compare the outcomes of the pricing
game for two specific distributions of the consumers’ preferences.
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In Section 1.4, we assume that dAL = dBL =: dL, and (d, dL) ∼ i.i.d. U2[0, 1].
Such a specification is analogous to Verboven (1999), Armstrong and Vickers
(2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002), and describes the case where consumers
perceive the difference between L and H to the same extent at both firms.
By contrast, in Section 1.5 we assume that d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1]. There, vertical
preferences with respect to the two firms are completely uncorrelated. It might
be that at firm A a consumer barely notices any difference between L and H,
whereas at firm B the willingness to pay is much higher for H than for L.
1.3 General Demand Function:
Differing Markups on H and L
Before examining the competing firms’ equilibrium behavior, we need to deter-
mine their demand as a function of all prices.
Demand Function QAH , firm A’s total demand for product H, is the (ex-
ante) probability that a consumer prefers to buy H at A to buying H or L at
B or L at A. Using (1), we have
QAH = P [qAH = 1] = P
[
pAH + td ≤ pBH + t(1− d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
d≤HH
∩ pAH + td ≤ pBL + t(1− d) + tLdBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
d≤HL
(5)
∩ pAH + td < pAL + td+ tLdAL
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dAL>x
A
.
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In (5), XAXB refers to the “switching line”, below which a consumer’s value of
d must lie such that he or she prefers to buy XA ∈ {L,H} at A as compared
to buying XB ∈ {L,H} at B. As defined in (4), xA is the critical value of dAL
above which a consumer prefers to buy H at A instead of L at A. Analogically,
we write QAL as
QAL = P [qAL = 1] = P
[
pAL + td+ tLdAL ≤ pBH + t(1− d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
d≤LH
∩ pAL + td+ tLdAL ≤ pBL + t(1− d) + tLdBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
d≤LL
(6)
∩ pAL + td+ tLdAL ≤ pAH + td
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dAL≤xA
.
After solving the first two inequalities in (5) for d, we write the conditional joint
probability of d ≤ HH and d ≤ HL as
P
[
d ≤ HH ∩ d ≤ HL|dAL , dBL
]
=
∫ min{HH,HL}
0
f(d|dAL , dBL )dd. (7)
For this equality to be true, we need min{HH,HL} ∈ [0, 1]. In an interior
symmetric equilibrium, this condition holds by symmetry and condition (4),
provided 0 ≤ (pAH−pBL )/t ≤ 1.9 That is, prices need to be sufficiently close; and
therefore, for each combination of dAL and dBL , there are both consumers with
small values of d who buy H at A and consumers with large values of d who
buy any of the products at B. By incorporating the remaining inequality in
9In Section 1.4, this additional condition is redundant, as dAL = dBL is sufficient for
min{HH,HL} ∈ [0, 1] and min{LH,LL} ∈ [0, 1]. In Section 1.5, we first assume the validity
of the condition, and subsequently prove that pAH − pBL > t cannot hold in any symmetric
interior equilibrium.
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(5), dAL > xA, into (7), we obtain
QAH =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
xA
(∫ min{HH,HL}
0
f(d, dAL , dBL )dd
)
ddAL
)
ddBL . (8)
In the upper part of Figure 1.1, we graphically represent QAH , the region where
d ≤ HH, d ≤ HL, and dAL > xA. For given prices pAH and pAL , with pAH > pAL ,
consumers buy H at A if their value of d is low and their value of dAL is high.
Furthermore, in order for a consumer to buy H, dBL must not be too small.
d
dAL
dBLxA = p
A
H−pAL
tL
1
2 +
pBL−pAH
2t
1
2 +
pBL−pAL
2t
1
2 +
pBH−pAL
2t
xB = p
B
H−pBL
tL
tL
2t
tL
2t
A¯
Figure 1.1: Consumers who buy A’s high-quality product, QAH , are displayed in
the upper region, where dAL > xA. Consumers who buy A’s low-quality product,
QAL , are displayed in the lower region, where dAL ≤ xA.
The derivation of QAL is analogous to the derivation of QAH . Consumers buy L
at A if this is more favorable than either buying any of H or L at B or buying
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H at A. Using (6), we obtain
QAL =
∫ 1
0
(∫ xA
0
(∫ min{LH,LL}
0
f(d, dAL , dBL )dd
)
ddAL
)
ddBL . (9)
In the lower part of Figure 1.1, we graphically represent QAL , the region where
d ≤ LH, d ≤ LL, and dAL ≤ xA. By comparing QAH and QAL , the following
asymmetry stands out. Regarding d, the support of QAH is independent of
dAL , whereas the support of QAL increases for a decreasing dAL . In other words,
regarding consumers of L, the utility is generally higher the lower dAL is. On
the other hand, consumers of H all obtain the same level of utility, once we
abstract from d. As it later turns out, this asymmetry plays a crucial role for
the determination of markups whenever we assume that a change in dAL not
necessarily implies a change in dBL .
Equilibrium In the following, we first determine the prices and profits which
occur in symmetric interior equilibria. Later, for each distribution of d which
we analyze, we also check whether firms have incentives to deviate to corner
solutions, i.e., by only selling L or H. Furthermore, we demonstrate that sym-
metric corner solutions cannot constitute equilibria in each of the considered
cases.
In an interior equilibrium, firm A maximizes
piA = QAH(pAH − cH) +QAL(pAL − cL), (10)
with QAH and QAL defined in (8) and (9). Since the integrands in QAH and QAL
are continuous functions in pAH and pAL , (10) is differentiable, and the first-
order conditions (FOCs) with respect to pAH and pAL are necessarily satisfied in
an interior equilibrium. As we show in Appendix 1.A.1, after imposing pAH =
pBH =: pH and pAL = pBL =: pL (and thus xA = xB =: x), we can express the FOC
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with respect to pAH as(∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
mHddALddBL +
∫ 1
0
AH(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL
)
(pH − cH)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
AHddALddBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=QAH
+
∫ 1
0
AH(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL (pL − cL), (11)
where AH and mH are defined as follows.
AH :=
∫ min{HH,HL}
0
f(d)dd
denotes the amount of H-consumers at A for given values of dAL and dBL , and
mH := (1/2t)f(min{HH,HL}, dAL , dBL )
is the “margin” of AH , that is, the subset of AH which leaves firm A towards
firm B after a marginal increase of pAH .
How can we interpret equation (11)? Of course, in an interior optimum, the
marginal benefits of increasing pAH equal the marginal costs. The left-hand
side of (11) displays the latter: The first term, where dAL > x, relates to A’s
H-consumers which leave A towards B if A raises pAH . By doing so, the firm
looses pH − cH on each of these consumers. It also looses the same markup on
consumers who stay at A but start to buy L instead of H. The measure of
these intra-firm migrants is A¯/tL, where A¯ :=
∫ 1
0 A
H(dAL = x)ddBL is shown in
Figure 1.1. The same consumers, however, are also part of the marginal benefit
of increasing pAH , which we display on the right-hand side of (11). On each
such consumer, A gains pL − cL, the markup on L. The remaining part of the
marginal benefit is QAH , which refers to the infra-marginal consumers on whom
A benefits by increasing pAH .
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Analogically, and also in Appendix 1.A.1, we simplify the symmetric-version
FOC with respect to pAL as(∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
mLddALddBL +
∫ 1
0
AL(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL
)
(pL − cL)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
ALddALddBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=QAL
+
∫ 1
0
AL(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL (pH − cH), (12)
where AL :=
∫min{LH,LL}
0 f(d)dd, and mL := (1/2t)f(min{LH,LL}, dAL , dBL )
are similarly interpreted as AH and mH . In Appendix 1.A.1, we show that
AL(dAL = x) = AH(dAL = x). That is, marginal consumers within firm A are the
same for changes in pAH and changes in pAL . We highlight these consumers by A¯
in Figure 1.1.
Beyond that, equation (12) again displays two considerations. First, we have
the conventional tradeoff between gains on infra-marginal consumers and losses
on marginal consumers who leave the firm. Second, regarding A¯/tL, the FOC
displays an instance of “intra-firm competition” between H at A and L at A.
Before heading to applications of what we established so far, we state Proposi-
tion 1, which sheds some new light on the results of Verboven (1999), Armstrong
and Vickers (2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002).
Proposition 1. Suppose there is a symmetric interior equilibrium of the pricing
game, where pH − pL ≤ t. Then the firms’ markups on H and L are generally
different.
Proof. Note that min{HH,HL} = HH if and only if dBL > x. Analogically,
min{LH,LL} = LH if and only if dBL > x. Next, suppose that markups on H
and L were identical. DefineM = pH − cH = pL − cL. In this case, adding up
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equations (11) and (12) yields
1
2t
(∫ x
0
(∫ x
0
f(LL, dAL , dBL )ddBL +
∫ 1
x
f(LH, dAL , dBL )ddBL
)
ddAL
+
∫ 1
x
(∫ x
0
f(HL, dAL , dBL )ddBL +
∫ 1
x
f(HH, dAL , dBL )ddBL
)
ddAL
)
M
= QAL +QAH = 1/2,
where the second equality is based on the symmetry condition.
We see that, in general, markups on H and L are not identical: Even though a
variation in the distribution of either dAL or dBL could be absorbed by a change
ofM (it necessarily holds that x = (cH − cL)/2), this is generally not possible
for a change in both of these distributions.
As a corollary, Proposition 1 implies that, if f(d) is constant (and therefore
equals 1) and there are identical markups on H and L, these markups are
M = t. More importantly, the same applies if
f(d) =
1 if d
A
L = dBL ,
0 otherwise,
(13)
which is the standard case in the literature.
In Section 1.4, we show that markups are indeed identical (and therefore equal
M) in this standard case, and that symmetric equilibria usually exist and are
interior. Thereupon, in Sections 1.5 and 1.6, we discuss counterexamples where
markups on H and L differ.
1.4 The Benchmark:
Correlated Vertical Preferences
Here we consider the case where each consumer perceives the quality difference
between L and H to the same extent at both firms. We show that, from a
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firm’s point of view, the presence of a second (vertically differentiated) product
is inconsequential, as compared to the standard Hotelling case.
Demand Function Specifically, we assume that dAL = dBL =: dL, and (d, dL) ∼
i.i.d. U2[0, 1]. The difference in utility between consuming H and L is the same
at both firms. In this case, equations (8) and (9) simplify to
QAH =
∫ 1
xA
(∫ min{HH,HL}
0
dd
)
ddL, and QAL =
∫ xA
0
(∫ min{LH,LL}
0
dd
)
ddL.
We show graphical representations of QAH and QAL in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, re-
spectively, which can be considered as cross-sections of Figure 1.1 for which
dAL = dBL .
In Figure 1.2, each of three shaded areas represents consumers who prefer to
buy H at A as compared buying either H at B (d ≤ HH), L at B (d ≤ HL)
or L at A (dAL > xA). The intersection of these areas is QAH . In a symmetric
equilibrium, d ≤ HL, which is bordered by the upward-sloping line, never
binds: Whenever a consumer prefers buying H at A over buying L at A and
H at B, it follows from symmetric prices and dAL = dBL that this consumer also
prefers buying H at A over buying L at B. In other words, there is no direct
“inter-firm” competition between H and L.
In Figure 1.3, we represent QAL . Here, the downward-sloping line borders d ≤
LH, a condition which also never binds, for exactly the same reason.
Equilibrium and Welfare In order determine prices and profits of a sym-
metric interior equilibrium, we start with the FOCs (11) and (12), which hold
in a symmetric interior equilibrium. Thereupon, we show that firms do not
have incentives to deviate to a corner solution, that is, by only selling L or H.
Furthermore, we show that, in general, a symmetric corner solution is not an
equilibrium either.
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d = dL = 0
xA = p
A
H−pAL
tL
dL = 1
d = 11
2 +
pBL−pAH
2t
1
2 +
pBH−pAH
2t
2t
tL
A¯ = 1/2
Figure 1.2: The fraction of consumers which buy firm A’s high-quality product,
QAH , is given by the intersection of the three shaded areas.
By applying (13) to (11) and (12), we write the symmetric-version FOCs with
respect to pAH and pAL as(1− x
2t +
1
2tL
)
(pH − cH) = 1− x2 +
1
2tL
(pL − cL), (14)
and
(
x
2t +
1
2tL
)
(pL − cL) = x2 +
1
2tL
(pH − cH). (15)
Before discussing equations (14) and (15), we use them to establish Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. If dAL = dBL = dL, and (d, dL) ∼ i.i.d. U2[0, 1], symmetric interior
equilibria of the pricing game are characterized by p∗H = cH + t and p∗L = cL + t.
Proof. Note that x(p∗H , p∗L) = (cH− cL)/tL and (p∗H , p∗L) solves (14) and (15). In
the opposite direction, assume to the contrary that pH − cH > pL − cL. If this
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d = dL = 0
xA = p
A
H−pAL
tL
dL = 1
d = 11
2 +
pBL−pAL
2t
1
2 +
pBH−pAL
2t
2t
tL
A¯ = 1/2
Figure 1.3: The fraction of consumers which buy firm A’s low-quality product,
QAH , is given by the intersection of the three shaded areas.
is the case, (14) implies that pH − cH < t, while (15) implies that pL − cL > t.
Therefore, pL − cL > t > pH − cH , which contradicts pH − cH < pL − cL. Since
pH − cH < pL − cL yields a similar contradiction, it must hold that pH − cH =
pL − cL =: M. Formulated this way, (14) reads (1 − x)/2t ×M = (1 − x)/2,
orM = pH − cH = pL − cL = t. In Appendix 1.A.2, we show that there are no
unilateral deviations towards corner solutions.
How can we interpret Lemma 1? In the symmetric equilibrium, each firm serves
half the customer base, a fraction x of which buys L and a fraction 1−x buys H.
Markups on H and L are identically equal to t, and profits are pi(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2.
The left-hand side of equation (14) displays the marginal cost of increasing pAH :
(1 − x)/2t consumers (A’s H-consumers) leave A towards B; and 1/2tL con-
sumers change the product but not the firm. The right-hand side of (14) shows
the marginal benefit of increasing pAH : (1 − x)/2 relates to A’s infra-marginal
consumers; and 1/2tL start buying L instead of H at A. The interpretation
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of (15) is analogous. Thus, from identical markups on H and L, there is no
need for A to care about customers who stay with A but only swap qualities.
It solely remains to trade off between the marginal cost from consumers who
leave A and the marginal benefit on infra-marginal ones. That is, regarding H,
A and B play a standard Hotelling game with respect to these consumers for
whom dL > x = (cH − cL)/tL. Concerning consumers with dL ≤ x, A and B
play a Hotelling game regarding L. As we have seen earlier, in a symmetric
equilibrium, A’s version of H does not directly compete with B’s version of L.
That is, by marginally raising pAH , A affects the composition of its own customer
base, and A looses some consumers who start buying H at B. From dAL = dBL ,
however, there is no first-order effect concerning consumers who both change
the firm and the product. In Section 1.5, we drop the assumption of correlated
vertical preferences. There, both H and L of B will pose a threat if A increases
pAH or pAL . The alternative assumption dAL⊥dBL will crucially change the result of
Lemma 1.
Before concluding this section with a more general statement which takes into
account the possibility of corner solutions, we compare the market outcome
with first-best efficient allocations. In the present case, maximizing a utilitarian
welfare function is equivalent to minimizing the sum of the firms’ production
cost and the consumers’ disutility from both horizontal and vertical distance to
the product which is actually bought. If and only if it is efficient that consumer
d¯ buys L at A, it is efficient that consumers with lower values of d and dL
also buy L at A. Likewise, if and only if it is efficient that d¯ buys H at A, it
is efficient that consumers with lower values of d and higher values of dL also
buy H at A. Hence, in order to determine a socially efficient allocation, it is
sufficient to find cutoff values d¯∗ and d¯∗L which minimize
W (d¯, d¯L) =
∫ d¯
0
(∫ d¯L
0
cL + td+ tLdLddL +
∫ 1
d¯L
cH + tdddL
)
dd
+
∫ 1
d¯
(∫ d¯L
0
cL + t(1− d) + tLdLddL +
∫ 1
d¯L
cH + t(1− d)ddL
)
dd.
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The FOCs of W (d¯, d¯L) with respect to d¯ and d¯L yield d¯∗ = 1/2 and d¯∗L = (cH −
cL)/tL. These cutoff levels comply with the market solutions described in the
following proposition. Market allocations are efficient because, abstracting from
horizontal preferences, dAL = dBL implies that firms are in a Bertrand situation,
which in turn leads to first-best efficiency.
Before relaxing dAL = dBL , we summarize the main findings of this section in
Proposition 2. We present the remaining parts of the proof in Appendix 1.A.3.
Proposition 2. If dAL = dBL = dL, and (d, dL) ∼ i.i.d. U2[0, 1], symmetric
equilibria of the pricing game are characterized by p∗H = cH + t and p∗L = cL + t.
Consumers with d ≤ 1/2 (d > 1/2) buy at firm A (B). Consumers with dL >
(cH − cL)/tL (dL ≤ (cH − cL)/tL) buy H (L). Each firm’s equilibrium profit is
pi(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2, and the market outcome is efficient.
1.5 Uncorrelated Vertical Preferences (I):
Markups on L May Be Higher
Here we consider the case where the consumer-specific perception of the quality
difference between H and L depends on the firm. We show that, in contrast to
the outcome of Section 1.4, the markup on L is higher than the markup on H,
equilibrium profits increase, and the market outcome is inefficient.
Demand Function From d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], we use the definitions in (8) and
(9) with f(d) ≡ 1 to describe QAH and QAL . The difference in utility between
consuming H and L is now specific to the firm. For a graphical representation of
QAH and QAL , recall Figure 1.1 in Section 1.3. There, we hinted at a fundamental
asymmetry between QAH and QAL , which we study now in greater detail.
Abstracting from the horizontal characteristic d, consumers with high values of
dAL (which buy H at A) all obtain the same utility, which equals the utility of
consumers who are indifferent between buying L and H. To see this, consider
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Figure 1.4, which reproduces Figure 1.1 and augments it by QBH and QBL (as they
are allocated in a symmetric interior equilibrium). Consumer dLH is indifferent
d
dAL
dBLx
1/2
x
tL
2t
tL
2t
dLH
dH
dL
Figure 1.4: In a symmetric interior equilibrium allocation, consumers with high
values of dAL and low values of d buy H at A; consumers with low values of dAL
and low values of d buy L at A; consumers with high values of dBL and high
values of d buy H at B; and consumers with low values of dBL and high values
of d buy L at B.
between buying at A and buying at B, but also between buying L and buying
H. Consumers with higher values of dAL , such as consumer dH, are indifferent
between the firms, but prefer buying product H once they opt for firm A. The
only difference between dLH and dH concerns the realization of dAL . For a H-
consumer, however, dAL is irrelevant, as it only affects the utility of L-consumers.
For these, the lower the value of dAL , the higher is the utility obtained from
buying L. Therefore, consumers who resemble dLH, but exhibit lower values of
dAL , are strictly better off than dLH (by buying L at H). Consequentially, even
consumers with higher values of d, such as dL, are equally well off as dLH.
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Naturally, we can replicate this thought experiment for each consumer who is
indifferent between either of the product versions at A. As we see in Figure 1.4,
this results in an inflated quantity QAL . More precisely, the ratio between A’s
infra-marginal L-consumers and A’s marginal L-consumers (on the boundary
towards B) exceeds the same ratio with respect to A’s H-consumers. This, in
turn, provides an incentive for A to raise pAL .
Equilibrium and Welfare As in Section 1.4, we start with the FOCs (11)
and (12), which apply in a symmetric interior equilibrium. Thereupon, we show
once more that firms do not have incentives to deviate to a corner solution,
and we demonstrate that, in general, a symmetric corner solution is not an
equilibrium either.
After imposing f(d) ≡ 1 on (11) and (12), we write the symmetric-version
FOCs with respect to pAH and pAL as(
1− x
2t +
A¯
tL
)
(pH − cH) = (1− x)A¯+ A¯
tL
(pL − cL), (16)
and
(
x
2t +
A¯
tL
)
(pL − cL) = x
(
A¯+ pH − pL4t
)
+ A¯
tL
(pH − cH), (17)
where A¯ := 1/2− (tL/4t)x2 represents the frontier between consumers of H and
consumers of L at A (see Figure 1.1).
Equations (16) and (17) help us understand the firms’ equilibrium behavior.
The left-hand side of (16) displays the marginal cost of increasing pAH : A share
of A’s customers who are indifferent between the two firms, namely the fraction
1 − x which buys H at A, leaves A towards B; an additional fraction A¯/tL
moves inside the firm to buy L. On both of these groups, A loses pH − cH
per customer. Regarding the customers which move within A, however, the
marginal loss is offset by a marginal profit of pL − cL on L. We see this on the
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right-hand side of (16), alongside with (1 − x)A¯, A’s existing consumers of H,
on whom A increases its profit by increasing pAH .
The interpretation of (17) is similar. An increase of pAL leads to a per-customer
loss of pL − cL on L, both on consumers leaving A towards B (x) and on the
ones moving internally (A¯/tL). Again, part of this loss is retained by a gain on
H. The marginal profit on infra-marginal consumers, however, looks different
here (x(A¯ + (pH − pL)/4t), instead of xA¯). These additional x(pH − pL)/4t
consumers refer to a firm’s inflated demand for L, as we elaborated in the
previous paragraph.
If pAH = pAL , infra-marginal L-consumers, and with them the associated asymme-
try, disappear. As we show next, cH = cL is a sufficient condition for pAH = pAL
in a symmetric interior equilibrium. In this case, (16) and (17) have a simple
solution, which is identical markups on H and L. This, however, only holds
for cH = cL. In a next step, we will thus “perturb” cH to examine equilibrium
markups on H and L in a more general setting where cH ≥ cL.
Lemma 2. If d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], and cH = cL, in a symmetric interior equilib-
rium of the pricing game it must hold that pH = pL.
Proof. If pH < pL, nobody buys L. If pH > pL, we know from (16) that
(pH − cH)/2t < A¯. (18)
From (17), pH > pL implies
(pL − cL)/2t > A¯+ (pH − pL)/4t. (19)
By combining (18) and (19), we have pL − cL > 2tA¯ + (pH − pL)/2 > 2tA¯ >
pH − cH , a contradiction to cH = cL and pH > pL.
In words, in the case of identical costs cH = cL, it cannot be that markups on
high-quality products are higher than markups on low-quality products. As we
state in (18), if pH > pL, firms had an incentive to lower pH and internally move
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consumers to H, unless there were relatively many infra-marginal consumers of
H.10 Meanwhile, as we state in (19), firms had an incentive to raise pL, unless
there were relatively little infra-marginal consumers of L. High gains on infra-
marginal H-consumers and low gains on infra-marginal L-consumers, however,
cannot occur simultaneously. The former implies a high amount H-consumers.
The latter implies a high amount of L-consumers, as here the ratio between
infra-marginal and marginal consumers (marginal with respect to B) decreases
with the quantity of low-quality consumers.
Next, we show that, for the special case cH = cL, the equilibrium prices equal
the ones in Section 1.4.
Lemma 3. If d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], and cH = cL, the only symmetric interior
equilibrium of the pricing game is characterized by p∗H = cH + t and p∗L = cL+ t.
Proof. Note that x(p∗H , p∗L) = 0, A(p∗H , p∗L) = 1/2, and therefore (p∗H , p∗L) solves
(16) and (17). In the opposite direction, Lemma 2 requires pH−cH = pL−cL =:
M. Formulated this way, (17) reads (1/2t + 1/2tL)M = 1/2 + (1/2tL)M,
implying M = pH − cH = pL − cL = t. Later, that is, for the general case
without restricting to cH = cL, we show that there are no unilateral deviations
towards corner solutions.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is simple: Given pH = pL, the probability that
a consumer buys H is 1. Therefore, vertical preferences do not play a role, and
the firms essentially play a standard Hotelling game, the familiar outcome of
which is p∗H = cH + t. The according profits are pi(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2.
Once we drop the assumption cH = cL, matters become more difficult. In
particular, the analytic solution to (16) and (17) is generally intricate and barely
interpretable. Since Lemma 3 reveals a simple solution for cH = cL, however,
we can use “perturbation methods” (see, for instance, Judd, 1996) in order
to locally approximate p∗H and p∗L for cH > cL near cH = cL. In our case, the
10“Relatively” refers to the relation between A’s (1−x)A infra-marginal H-consumers and
the marginal gain (1− x)(pH − cH) on consumers who start buying at A if pAH decreases.
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appropriate perturbation technique consists of using Taylor’s theorem alongside
with the implicit function theorem for R2. In Appendix 1.A.4, we derive second-
degree Taylor approximations for p∗H and p∗L which we present in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. If d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], and cH ≥ cL sufficiently close, the only sym-
metric interior equilibrium of the pricing game is characterized by
p∗H = cH + t+O
(
(cH − cL)3
)
and
p∗L = cL + t+
(cH − cL)2
2t +O
(
(cH − cL)3
)
.
Sketch of Proof. After defining p := (pH , pL), we write (16) and (17) as f(p) =
0 and g(p) = 0. Next, we define F(p) := (f(p), g(p)). By the implicit function
theorem, it holds that
[Fp]cH=cLp′ + [Fc]cH=cL = 0, (20)
and
[Tpp(p′)]cH=cLp′ + [Fp]cH=cLp′′ + 2[Fpc]cH=cLp′ + [Fcc]cH=cL = 0, (21)
where p′ := dp/dcH , p′′ := d2p/(dcH)2, Fp(c) is the Jacobian of F with respect
to p (cH), Fpc (Fcc) is the derivative of Fp (Fc) with respect to cH , and Tpp(p′)
is a multiplicative operation of p′ and the Hessian tensor of F with respect to
p, which we explicitly formulate in Appendix 1.A.4. Also in Appendix 1.A.4,
we compute Fp and Fc, and solve (20) for p′. This yields p′ = (1, 0).11 After
plugging this first-order approximation into (21), and computing Tpp(p′), Fpc,
and Fcc, we obtain p′′ = (0, 1/t). By Taylor’s theorem, we yield the proposed
second-order approximation of p. In Appendix 1.A.4, we also show that there
are no incentives to unilaterally deviate to selling only one product.
11This first-order approximation perfectly mirrors Lemma 1 in Section 1.4. There, however,
we have p′′ = 0, an invalid result in the case of uncorrelated vertical preferences.
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Lemma 4 states that, once we assume that vertical preferences are uncorrelated,
markups on L are higher than on H, at least in a neighborhood of cH = cL.12
We discussed the reason for this in the previous paragraph (see Figure 1.4):
In contrast to H-buyers, the consumer rent of L-buyers generally increases the
further consumers are from A¯, the “switching line” between buying H and L.
This leads to proportionally more infra-marginal L-consumers, and acts as an
incentive to narrow the gap between pAH and pAL .13
Before concluding this section, we make a remark about welfare. As in Section
1.4, from a utilitarian point of view, we are only interested in the allocation of
consumers but not in prices. However, if prices were such that both a social
planner and a consumer d¯ = (d¯, d¯AL , d¯BL ) were indifferent between d¯ buying any
of the four product versions, these prices were socially optimal regarding all
other consumers as well. From identical marginal costs of A and B, it follows
that a planner chooses d¯∗ = 1/2. From (1), the planner’s allocation further
satisfies
v − d¯/2− cH = v − d¯/2− tLd¯AL − cL ⇔ d¯A∗L = (cH − cL)/tL.
On the other hand, regarding the market solution, we have seen in Lemma 4
that for the vertically indifferent consumer x it holds that
x(p∗H , p∗L) =
p∗H − p∗L
tL
' cH − cL
tL
− (cH − cL)
2
2ttL
.
Accordingly, too many consumers buy H. That is, the markup on L is not
higher for efficiency reasons, but only because, on top of horizontal competition
softening, firm-specific vertical preferences additionally cushion competition.
12This might be different for slightly modified assumptions, as we show in the following
section.
13An interesting corollary to Lemma 4 is that firms generally profit from higher (!) marginal
costs on H. Only with costs (and prices) apart, the above asymmetry comes into effect. The
markup on L becomes strictly higher than t, and profits reach values above t/2.
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We summarize the central findings of this section in Proposition 3, which also
rules out corner equilibria, except for cH = cL. We discuss the remaining parts
of the proof of Proposition 3 in 1.A.5.14
Proposition 3. If d ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1], and cH ≥ cL, with cH and cL sufficiently
close, symmetric equilibria of the pricing game are characterized by p∗H ' cH + t
and p∗L ' cL + t + (cH − cL)2/2t. A’s (B’s) consumers buy H if and only if
dAL (dBL ) > (p∗H − p∗L)/tL, and otherwise buy L. Each firm’s equilibrium profit is
pi(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2 at cH = cL, and locally increases in cH . From a welfare point
of view, too many consumers buy H.
1.6 Uncorrelated Vertical Preferences (II):
Markups on H May Be Higher
In the previous section, we described vertical preferences by the firm-specific
disutility a buyer receives if he or she consumes L instead of H. This implies
that, abstracting from horizontal characteristics, the high-quality product H is
perceived in exactly the same manner at the two firms. In this final section,
we suppose that the relation between H and L is in the opposed direction.
Consuming H instead of L now generates additional utility, which we assume
to be firm-specific.
To do so, we could stay with the previous utility function, and assume for the
distribution of consumers that d ∼ i.i.d. U3 [(0, 1)× (−1, 0)× (−1, 0)]. This
would both alter the formulation of QAH and QAL and result in a counterintuitive
interpretation. In particular, L would be the high-quality product, andH would
be the low-quality product, which seems somewhat odd.
14The proof also includes an argument why piH − pjL ≤ t, {i, j} ∈ {A,B}, a condition
we took for granted so far. A rough intuition is as follows. With prices for H and L far
apart, firm A wishes to relocate consumers from L to H by lowering pAH , unless there is a
large amount of infra-marginal H-consumers. The latter, however, cannot be the case with
pAH − pAL > t, as in such a (putative) equilibrium most consumers prefer to buy L.
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For the sake of exposition, we thus modify the utility function (1) to
ui(d′) := ui(d, uAH , uBH) =
v − p
i
H − tdi + tHuiH if qiH = 1,
v − piL − tdi if qiL = 1.
(22)
We remain assuming unit demand, t > 0, tH > 0, and d′ ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1].
Intuitively, instead of seeing L as a (firm-specific) inferior version of H, we
interpret the difference between H and L as a firm-specific “add-on” in the
sense of Verboven (1999) and Ellison (2005).
Apart from that, our analysis remains the same as in Section 1.5. For this
reason, we do not repeate the above arguments one by one but focus on the
fundamental intuition behind the analysis.
From (22), we specify A’s demand for H as
QAH =
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
xA
(∫ min{HH,HL}
0
dd
)
duAH
)
duBH ,
QAL =
∫ 1
0
(∫ xA
0
(∫ min{LH,LL}
0
dd
)
duAH
)
duBH .
Except re-labeling (writing uAH and uBH instead of dAL and dBL ), QAH and QAL
are the same as in (8) and (9). What differs, however, are the expressions for
HH, HL, LH, and LL. Recall that we defined XAXB as the value of d such
that a consumer is indifferent between buying XA at A and XB at B. As we
see in Figure 1.5, it is now min{LH,LL} which is constant in uAH , whereas
min{HH,HL} increases in uAH . This asymmetry results in an inflated amount
of infra-marginal H-consumers, and we expect p∗H − cH to exceed p∗L − cL.
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d
uAH
uBH
xA = p
A
H−pAL
tL
1
2 − tL−p
B
H+p
A
L
2t
1
2 +
pBL−pAL
2t
1
2 +
tL−pAH+pBL
2t
xB = p
B
H−pBL
tL
tL
2t
tL
2t
A¯
Figure 1.5: Consumers who buy A’s high-quality product, QAH , are displayed in
the upper region, where uAH > xA. Consumers who buy A’s low-quality product,
QAL , are displayed in the lower region, where uAH ≤ xA.
Indeed, by approximating equilibrium prices around cH = cL+ tH15 in the same
fashion as we did in the previous section, for cH ≤ cL + tH , we obtain
p∗H = cH + t+
(cH − cL − tH)2
2t +O
(
cH − cL − tH)3
)
and
p∗L = cL + t+O
(
(cH − cL − tH)3
)
.
15We need to approximate around cH = cL + tL instead of cH = cL in order to avoid
non-continuities at cH = cL. At cH = cL + tH , we obtain QAH = 0, which is analogous to
QAL = 0 at cH = cL in Section 1.5. In both instances, departing from this limiting cases, the
first- and second-order effects come just into effect, and we can compare the results.
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Hence, markups are higher for H, and too many consumers buy L, as compared
to what would socially be efficient.
After checking for unilateral deviations and considering putative corner equilib-
ria, we can state Proposition 4, which is analogous to Proposition 3 in Section
1.5.
Proposition 4. If the consumers’ preferences are as in (22), d′ ∼ i.i.d. U3[0, 1],
and cH ≤ cL + tH , with cH and cL + tH sufficiently close, symmetric equilibria
of the pricing game are characterized by p∗H ' cH + t+ (cH − cL − tH)2/2t and
p∗L ' cL+ t. A’s (B’s) consumers buy H if and only if uAH (uBH) > (p∗H−p∗L)/tL,
and otherwise buy L. Each firm’s equilibrium profit is pi(p∗H , p∗L) = t/2 at cH =
cL+ tH , and locally increases for a decreasing cH . From a welfare point of view,
too many consumers buy L.
1.7 Conclusion
General models of horizontal and vertical market segmentation find that, in
oligopolistic contexts, markups do not vary with quality.
We qualify this somewhat counterintuitive result by relaxing the assumption
that vertical preferences are perfectly harmonious across firms: a high reduction
in utility from consuming the low-quality product instead of the high-quality
product at one firm not necessarily implies the same at the firm’s competitor.
In such a setting, we find that markups on low-quality products exceed markups
on high-quality products in a symmetric interior equilibrium. To the contrary, if
low-quality products are only distinguished by their horizontal characteristics,
and supplementary utility from consuming a high-quality product is specific to
the firm, we obtain the opposite result.
From a welfare perspective of view, we want horizontal competition to be weak.
Although this softens competition, the lack of horizontal competitiveness does
not affect horizontal allocative efficiency.16 In addition, if firms are horizon-
16This, of course, crucially depends on our assumption of fully covered markets.
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tal substitutes, they differentiate their customers vertically. A social planner
wants to prevent this. Hence, regarding horizontal differentiation, the firms’
objective is perfectly in line with the objective of the planner. On the other
hand, regarding vertical preferences, the objectives of firms and planner are dia-
metrically opposed. If the prices of low-quality products are distorted, we want
the marginal valuation of quality to be high, such that more consumers buy
the high-quality product. If the prices of high-quality products are distorted,
we want the marginal valuation of quality to be low, such that more consumers
buy the low-quality product. On the other hand, as we have seen, firms’ profits
unanimously increase in the extent of price distortions.
In order to test our opposed results of Sections 1.5 and 1.6, we could ask for what
species of products it is the high-quality version for which the differentiation
is specific to the firm, and for which it is the low-quality version. According
to our theory, it is firm-specific differentiation which opens the door for higher
markups.
An interesting theoretical exercise would be to endogenize the firms’ choice of
the type and degree of differentiation. This, however, brings along intricacies
regarding asymmetric departure points in the second stage. As often in the
field, simulations could be a viable backdoor strategy.
Finally, our theory could be improved by allowing consumers to buy multiple
(or zero) units; by allowing firms to sell more than two product versions; by
considering asymmetric equilibria; or by including the entry decision of (ad-
ditional) firms. These and related considerations indicate that the scope for
augmenting and adjusting our model is almost unlimited.
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1.A Appendices to Chapter 1
1.A.1 First-order Conditions
The FOC with respect to pAH is
∂piA
∂pAH
=
∫ 1
0
−∫ 1
xA
1
2tf
(
min{HH,HL}, dAL , dBL
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:mH
ddAL
− 1
tL

∫ min{HH(dAL=xA),HL(dAL=xA)}
0
f(d, xA, dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:AH(dA
L
=xA)

ddBL (pAH − cH)
+
∫ 1
0

∫ 1
xA

∫ min{HH,HL}
0
f(d, dAL , dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:AH
 ddAL
 ddBL
+
∫ 1
0
 1tL
∫ min{LH(dAL=xA),LL(dAL=xA)}
0
f(d, xA, dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:AL(dA
L
=xA)
 ddBL (pAL − cL) != 0, (A.1)
with
HH := 12 +
pBH − pAH
2t ,
HL := 12 +
pBL − pAH
2t +
tL
2t d
B
L ,
LH := 12 +
pBH − pAL
2t −
tL
2t d
A
L ,
LL := 12 +
pBL − pAL
2t +
tL
2t (d
B
L − dAL).
In a symmetric equilibrium with pAL = pBL =: pL, pAH = pBH =: pH (and thus xA = xB =: x),
it holds that
min{HH,HL} =
{
HH = 1/2 if dBL ∈ (x, 1]
HL = (1/2t)(t+ pL − pH + tLdBL ) if dBL ∈ [0, x],
(A.2)
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and
min{LH,LL} =
{
LH = (1/2t)(t+ pH − pL − tLdiL ) if dBL ∈ (x, 1]
LL = (1/2t)(t+ tL(dBL − dAL)) if dBL ∈ [0, x].
(A.3)
Therefore, and from evaluating (A.2) and (A.3) at dAL = x, we have
AH(dAL = x|dBL > x) = AL(dAL = x|dBL > x) =
∫ 1/2
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd,
since
AH(dAL = x) =
∫ HH(dAL=x)
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd =
∫ 1/2
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd,
and
AL(dAL = x) =
∫ LH(dAL=x)
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd =
∫ 1/2
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd.
Analogically, for dB ≤ x, we obtain
AH(dAL = x|dAL ≤ x) = AL(dAL = x|dAL ≤ x) =
∫ 1
2+
pL−pH
2t +
tL
2t d
B
L
0
f(d, x, dBL )dd.
Consequently, we can simplify the FOC (A.1) to(∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
mHddALddBL +
∫ 1
0
AH(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL
)
(pH − cH)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
x
AHddALddBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=QA
H
+
∫ 1
0
AH(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL (pL − cL) (A.4)
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The FOC with respect to pAL is
∂piA
∂pAL
=
∫ 1
0
−∫ xA
0
1
2tf
(
min{LH,LL}, dAL , dBL
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:mL
ddAL
− 1
tL

∫ min{LH(dAL=xA),LL(dAL=xA)}
0
f(d, xA, dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=AL(dA
L
=xA)

ddBL (pAL − cL)
+
∫ 1
0

∫ xA
0

∫ min{LH,LL}
0
f(d, dAL , dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=AL
 ddAL
ddBL
+
∫ 1
0
 1tL
∫ min{HH(dAL=xA),HL(dAL=xA)}
0
f(d, xA, dBL )dd︸ ︷︷ ︸
=AH(dA
L
=xA)
 ddBL (pAH − cH) != 0. (A.5)
For the version of (A.5) which applies in a symmetric interior equilibrium, we use AL(dAL =
x) = AH(dAL = x) from above. Accordingly, we have(∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
mLddALddBL +
∫ 1
0
AL(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL
)
(pL − cL)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
ALddALddBL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=QA
L
+
∫ 1
0
AL(dAL = x)
tL
ddBL (pH − cH). (A.6)
1.A.2 Proof of Lemma 1 (Completion)
In absence of corner solutions, the proof is given in the main body of the text. Alternatively,
firm A may only sell either H or L. By only selling H, A’s objective function is
piA =
∫ 1
0
min
{
1
2 +
pBH − pAH
2t ,
1
2 +
pBL − pAH
2t +
tL
2t dL
}
ddL(pAH − cH),
the FOC of which is
pAH − cH =
∫ 1
0
min
{
t+ pBH − pAH , t+ pBL − pAH + tLdL
}
ddL.
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After plugging in pBH = cH + t and pBL = cL + t, we obtain p˜AH = cH + t− (cH − cL)2/4tL. A’s
markup on H thus is smaller than or equal to t. As A’s equilibrium profit is t/2, it remains
to be shown QAH(p˜AH) ≤ 1/2. Formally,
QAH(p˜AH) =
∫ 1
cH−cL
tL
1
2 +
(cH + t)−
(
cH + t− (cH − cL)2/4tL
)
2t ddL
+
∫ cH−cL
tL
0
1
2 +
(cL + t)−
(
cH + t− (cH − cL)2/4tL
)
2t +
tL
2t dLddL ≤
1
2 ,
from the definition of QAH . This holds for all cH and cL, because
⇔ (cH − cL)
2
4tL
+
∫ cH−cL
tL
0
tLdLddL ≤
∫ cH−cL
tL
0
cH − cLddL
⇔ (cH − cL)
2
4tL
+ (cH − cL)
2
2tL
≤ (cH − cL)
2
tL
.
By only selling L, A’s objective function is
piA =
∫ 1
0
min
{
1
2 +
pBH − pAL
2t −
tL
2t dL,
1
2 +
pBL − pAL
2t
}
ddL(pAL − cL).
From the associated FOC, we obtain p˜AL = cL+ t− (tL− cH + cL)2/4tL. Again, it is sufficient
to show that QAL(p˜AL) ≤ 1/2. Formally,
QAL(p˜AH) =
∫ 1
cH−cL
tL
1
2 +
(cH + t)−
(
cL + t− (tL − cH + cL)2/4tL
)
2t −
tL
2t dLddL
+
∫ cH−cL
tL
0
1
2 +
(cL + t)−
(
cL + t− (tL − cH + cL)2/4tL
)
2t ddL ≤
1
2 ,
from the definition of QAL . This holds for all considered values of cH and cL, because
⇔ (tL − cH + cL)
2
4tL
+
∫ 1
cH−cL
tL
(cH − cL)ddL ≤
∫ 1
cH−cL
tL
tLdLddL
⇔ tL − cH + cL4 + (cH − cL) ≤
tL
2
(
1 + cH − cL
tL
)
⇔ cH − cL ≤ tL,
which is true by assumption.
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1.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2 (Completion)
From Lemma 1 and condition (4), it follows that symmetric interior equilibria exist if and
only if 0 ≤ cH − cL < tL, and that they are characterized by p∗H = cH + t and p∗L = cL + t.
Regarding symmetric corner equilibria, first assume that both firms only sell H. In this case,
firm A maximizes
piA =
(
1
2 +
pBH − pAH
2t
)
(pAH − cH), (A.7)
with respect to pAH , as in the standard Hotelling case. The (symmetric) solution of (A.7) is
pA
∗
H = cH + t, and A’s profit is piA
∗ = t/2. Whenever A finds a price p˜AL such that its total
demand increases without decreasing the markup on either of its products, only selling H
cannot be an equilibrium. From (2), A steals customers from B by offering L if and only if
v − (p˜AL + tL × 0)− t/2 > v − (cH + t)− t/2 ⇔ p˜AL < cH + t. (A.8)
Meanwhile, A’s markup on either product is not lowered if and only if
p˜AL − cL ≥ pAH − cH = t ⇔ pAL ≥ cL + t. (A.9)
(A.8) and (A.9) are simultaneously feasible if and only if
cL + t < cH + t ⇔ cL < cH .
For cH = cL, check that p˜AH = cH + t and p˜AL = cL + t solve (14) and (15) for pBH = cH + t
and pBL = ∞. The resulting profit is piA(p˜AH , p˜AL) = t/2, hence there is no incentive to offer
both H and L in this case.
If both firms only sell L, A objective function is also the one of a standard Hotelling game,
because dAL = dBL = dL. Therefore, pA
∗
L = cL+ t, and piA
∗ = 1/2. In this case, the equivalents
to (A.9) and (A.8) yield that A has an incentive to offer H if and only if cH − cL < tL. For
cH = cL+ tL, p˜AH = cH + t and p˜AL = cL+ t solve (A.4) and (A.6) for pBH =∞ and pBL = cL+ t.
Again, the resulting profit is piA(p˜AH , p˜AL) = 1/2, and there is no incentive to offer both H and
L.
1.A.4 Proof of Lemma 4 (Completion)
We write (16) and (17) as
f˜(p) := A¯
tL
(pH − cH − pL + cL − tL(1− x)) + 1− x2t (pH − cH) = 0,
and
g˜(p) := A¯
tL
(pL − cL − pH + cH − tLx) + x2t
(
pL − cL − pH − pL2
)
= 0.
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In the following, we use f(p) = 2tf(p) = 0 and g(p) = 2tg(p) = 0, which simplifies fractions,
as we see later on. Furthermore, by using A¯ = 1/2 − (tL/4t)x2 and x = (pH − pL)/tL, we
write f(p) = 0 and g(p) = 0 as
2tLf(p) :=
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
(2(pH − pL)− cH + cL − tL)
+ 2tL(tL − pH + pL)(pH − cH) = 0, (A.10)
and
2tLg(p) :=
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
(2(pL − pH) + cH − cL)
+ 2tL(pH − pL)(pL − cL)− tL(pH − pL)2 = 0. (A.11)
The partial derivatives of (A.10) and (A.11) with respect to pH , pL, and cH are
2tL
∂f(p)
∂pH
=− 2(pH − pL) (2(pH − pL)− cH + cL − tL)
+
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
2− 2tL (2pH − pL − cH − tL) , (A.12)
2tL
∂f(p)
∂pL
= 2(pH − pL) (2(pH − pL)− cH + cL − tL)
− (2ttL − (pH − pL)2) 2 + 2tL (pH − cH) , (A.13)
2tL
∂f(p)
∂cH
=− 2ttL + (pH − pL)2 − 2tL (tL − pH + pL) , (A.14)
2tL
∂g(p)
∂pH
=− 2(pH − pL) (2(pL − pH) + cH − cL)
− (2ttL − (pH − pL)2) 2 + 2tL(2pL − pH − cL), (A.15)
2tL
∂g(p)
∂pL
= 2(pH − pL) (2(pL − pH) + cH − cL)
+
(
2ttL − (pH − pL)2
)
2− 2tL (3pL − 2pH − cL) . (A.16)
2tL
∂g(p)
∂cH
= 2ttL − (pH − pL)2. (A.17)
After substituting pH = cH + t and pL = cL + t into (A.12) through (A.17), we write (20) as(
t+ tL −t
−t t
)(
p′H
p′L
)
+
(−(t+ tL)
t
)
= 0,
the solution of which is (p′H , p′L) = (1, 0). After taking the derivatives of (A.12) through
(A.17) with respect to pH , pL, and cH , and after plugging in pH = cH + t and pL = cL + t
once more, we use (p′H , p′L) = (1, 0) in order to write (21) as
[Tpp(p′)]cH=cLp′ +
(
t+ tL −t
−t t
)(
p′′H
p′′L
)
+ 2
(
1 −1
0 0
)(
1
0
)
= 0. (A.18)
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Further, we write [Tpp(p′)]cH=cLp′ as Fpp(1)vec(p′p′T ), where Fpp(1) is the 1-mode flattening
matrix of the Hessian tensor of F with respect to p. That is,
[Tpp(p′)]cH=cLp′ =
(
fHH fHL fLH fLL
gHH gHL gLH gLL
)
1
0
0
0
 = (fHHgHH
)
,
where fij :=
[
∂2f(·)/∂pi∂pj
]
cH=cL
and gij :=
[
∂2g(·)/∂pi∂pj
]
cH=cL
. From (A.12) and
(A.15), we have fHH = gHH = −1, and we write (A.18) as(
t+ tL −t
−t t
)(
p′′H
p′′L
)
=
(−1
1
)
,
the solution of which is (p′′H , p′′L) = (0, 1/t).
Alternatively, firm A may only sell either H or L. In order to analyze such unilateral de-
viations for the general case cH ≥ cL, it is useful to first show that the objective function
is concave at cH = cL. From (A.1) and (A.5) with f(d) ≡ 1, and from the fact that the
piA(pAH , pAL) is twice differentiable, it follows that[
∂2piA
(∂pAH)2
]
cH=cL
= −1
t
− 12tL ,
[
∂2piA
(∂pAL)2
]
cH=cL
= − 12tL ,
and [
∂2piA
∂pAH∂p
A
L
]
cH=cL
=
[
∂2piA
∂pAL∂p
A
H
]
cH=cL
= 12tL
.
piA is locally strictly concave at cH = cL if the Hessian matrix H of its second derivatives is
negative definite. This is the case here, since the leading principal minors of
−H =
( 1
t +
1
2tL − 12tL− 12tL 12tL
)
are 1/t+ 1/2tL and 1/2ttL, that is, positive.
Next, for the case that cH = cL, consider firm A’s deviation to only selling H. In this case,
its objective function is
p˜iA =
∫ 1
0
min
{
1
2 +
pBH − pAH
2t ,
1
2 +
pBL − pAH
2t +
tL
2t d
B
L
}
ddBL .
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We state the according FOC with respect to pAH as
∂p˜iA
∂pAH
=
∫ 1
0
min
{
t+ pBH − pAH , t+ pBL − pAH + tLdBL
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
t+pB
H
−pA
H
≤t+pB
L
−pA
H
+tLdBL ⇔ dBL≥(pBH−pBL )/tL
ddBL − (pAH − cH) != 0.
Using pBH = cH + t and pBL = cL + t, this is
∫ cH−cL
tL
0
(t+ cL + t− pAH + tLdBL )ddBL
+
∫ 1
cH−cL
tL
(t+ cH + t− pAH)ddBL = pAA − cH .
From cH = cL, the first term cancels out, which implies p˜AH = cH + t. Since L is bought with
probability 0 at cH = cL, we have piA(p˜AH ,∞) = t/2, and there is no incentive to unilaterally
deviate. Furthermore, at cH = cL, we can equivalently set (p˜AH , p˜AL) to (cH + t, cL + t) , since
there the “no-selling constraint” with respect to L is not binding. From strict concavity and
continuity of piA at cH = cL, we know that the prices in Lemma 4 are uniquely best answers for
cH > cL sufficiently close. This makes the no-selling constraint concerning (p˜AH , p˜AL) binding,
which proves that deviating to only selling H is unilaterally not beneficial.
Next, consider firm A’s deviation to only selling L. Here, the objective function is
p˜iA =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
min
{
1
2 +
pBH − pAL
2t −
tL
2t d
A
L ,
1
2 +
pBL − pAL
2t +
tL
2t (d
B
L − dAL)
}
ddALddBL (pAL − cL). (A.19)
For cH = cL, we write the according FOC with respect to pAL as∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(t+ pBH − pAL − tLdAL)ddALddBL != pAL − cL,
which implies p˜AL = cL + t− tL/4. By plugging p˜AL , pBH = cH + t, and pBL = cL + t into (A.19),
and by imposing cH = cL, we yield
piA(∞, p˜AL) =
(
1
2 −
tL
8t
)(
t− tL4
)
<
1
2 t = pi
A(p∗H , p∗L).
Since both (p∗H , p∗L) and p˜AL are continuous functions in cH and cL, unilaterally deviating to
only selling L is also not beneficial in the case of cH > cL with cH and cL sufficiently close.
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1.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3 (Completion)
First, assume that both firms only sell H. In this case, they play a standard Hotelling game,
the solution of which is p∗H = cH + t and piA(p∗H) = t/2. Consider A’s potential deviation to
selling both products. The according FOCs are given by (A.1) and (A.5) with pBL = ∞. By
simplifying these we yield (16) and (17), with A¯ := 1/2 + (pBH − pAH)2t. For cH = cL, the
according solution is p˜AH = cH + t and p˜AL = cL + t. The resulting allocation of consumers is
the same as in the standard Hotelling case, and piA(p˜AH , p˜AL) = t/2. Therefore, both firms only
offering H is another equilibrium if cH = cL. If cH > cL, we apply the same approximation
method as in the proof of Lemma 4. We obtain
p˜AH = cH + t+
(cH − cL)2
4tL
+O ((cH − cL)3)
and
p˜AL = cL + t+
(
1
t
+ 12tL
)
(cH − cL)2
2 +O
(
(cH − cL)3
)
.
Since p˜AH − p˜AL > 0, firm A seeks to sell L, which in turn eliminates the putative equilibrium.
Consider the opposite case where both firms only sell L. Then, A’s objective function is
piA =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
1
2 +
pBL − pAL
2t
)
ddALddBL (pAL − cL).
From the associated FOC, and after imposing symmetry, we obtain p∗L = cL+t and piA(p∗L) =
t/2. In this case, A can increase its profit by only selling H at p˜AH = cL + t. By doing so, A
covers the whole market, and its profit is piA(p˜AH) = t − (cH − cL). Since piA(p˜AH) > piA(p∗L)
if and only if t/2 > cH − cL, firm A prefers to sell H if cH ≥ cL are sufficiently close. This
eliminates the second putative equilibrium.
So far, we assumed that piH − pjL ≤ t, {i, j} ∈ {A,B}. Suppose now, to the opposite, that
pAH−pAL > t. From (4), there is is no interior equilibrium if t > tL. Therefore, it remains for us
to demonstrate that t < p∗H − p∗L ≤ tL cannot be an equilibrium. From pAH − pBL > t it follows
that (8) and (9) no longer represent QAH and QAL , since min{HH,HL} and min{LH,LL}
lie outside [0, 1] for some combinations of dAL ∈ [0, 1] and dBL ∈ [0, 1]. This is illustrated in
Figure 1.A.1. Therefore, FOCs (16) and (17) need to be adjusted accordingly. The adapted
analogue of (16) is (
F¯
2t +
A¯
tL
)
(pH − cH) = F¯ A¯+ A¯
tL
(pL − cL), (A.20)
where
A¯ := 12tL
(
tL − pH + pL + t2
)
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d
dAL
dBL
1
2 +
pBL−pAL
2t
xB = (pBH − pBL )/tL
(pAH − pBL − t)/tL
(t + pAL − pBL )/tL
xA = p
A
H−pAL
tL
pBH−pAL−t
tL
t+pBL−pAL
tL
1
2 +
pAH−pBH
2t
tL
2t
tL
2t
A¯
F¯
Figure 1.A.1: Consumers who buy A’s high-quality product, QAH , are displayed in the upper
region, where dAL > xA. Consumers who buy A’s low-quality product, QAL , are displayed in
the lower region, where dAL ≤ xA.
represents the frontier between consumers of H and consumers of L at A, and
F¯ :=
(
1− pH − pL − t
tL
)(
1− pH − pL
tL
)
represents the “inter-firm” marginal consumers (see Figure 1.A.1). For cH ≥ cL with cH and
cL sufficiently close, (A.20) is necessarily violated if
A¯
tL
(pH − pL) > F¯ A¯− F¯2t (pH − cH). (A.21)
From pH − pL ≤ tL, we have A¯/tL ≥ t/4t2L; and from pH − pL > t, we have F¯ < (tL − t)/tL.
Using (A.21), it is thus sufficient to show that
t
4t2L
× t > tL − t
tL
(
A¯− pH − cH2t
)
(A.22)
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Also from pH − pL > t, we have pH − cH > t+ pL − cH . For cH sufficiently close to cL, this
implies pH − cH > t, since pL ≥ cL in any interior equilibrium. Further, pH − pL > t implies
that A¯ < (1/2tL)(tL− t/2) = 1/2− t/4tL. Using (A.22), it consequently suffices to show that(
t
2tL
)2
>
tL − t
tL
(
1
2 −
t
4tL
− 12
)
(A.23)
Since the left-hand side of (A.23) is positive, and the right-hand side of (A.23) is negative,
we have eliminated the third putative equilibrium.

Chapter 2
Selection upon Wage Posting
2.1 Introduction
Why do most job interviews end up without an agreement? In a recent study on
the Swiss market for skilled labor, Blatter, Muehlemann, and Schenker (2012)
establish that firms interview an average of 4.8 applicants to fill a single vacancy.
Similar results are available for other countries.1 In areas such as finance and
consulting, the percentage of applicants that are actually offered positions is
even considerably smaller. As Rivera (2011) points out, “elite professional ser-
vice firms often receive thousands or even tens of thousands of applications for
fewer than two hundred spots, yielding admissions ratios at the most prestigious
firms that are more competitive than that of any Ivy League College.” Related
to this, Moen (2003) summarizes that it is a “shared belief in the labor market
segmentation literature [. . . ] that too few high wage (primary sector) jobs are
created in the market.”
Observed high-end salaries, on the other hand, suggest that “high-end labor”
is a very scarce resource. Within a simple Walrasian framework, the salaries
1In an earlier study on the US labor market, Barron, Bishop, and Dunkelberg (1985)
report an average of 6.3 interviewed applicants to fill a position.
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prevailing in the mentioned industries indicate a steep supply curve, that is, a
small number of job candidates.
How can these two facts, small acceptance rates and high salaries, fit together?
We introduce a model where firms first announce their salaries. Thereupon,
candidates of differing productivities apply. Finally, each firm determines a
threshold regarding productivity signals, above which it is willing to hire an
applicant. These signals or “scores” can be interpreted as bits of information
which emerge, for instance, in the course of an entry talk.
Using parametric assumptions, we simulate the firms’ selection process, which in
turn determines the applicants’ employment probabilities. We show that, com-
pared to a Pareto optimal allocation, applicants approach firms with salaries
too high and employment probabilities too low. In particular, we find an expla-
nation why most encounters between employers and applicants end up without
agreements, even though—or rather because—salaries are high.
What are the key ingredients of a job market of which the equilibrium features
the afore-mentioned attributes?
Most of the modern labor-market literature is along the lines of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). The matching approach which is applied there stands in a
rich tradition of models that include bargaining as a mean of wage determina-
tion.2 In contrast to simplifying supply-and-demand considerations, this branch
of search theory is suitable to address issues such as the extent of unemploy-
ment. However, it does not provide a sufficiently explicit characterization of the
matching and wage formation process itself. Furthermore, it lacks to determine
the division of the surplus endogenously.
In addition to these theoretical concerns, models with ex-post bargaining are
repeatedly contested by empirical work. Hall and Krueger (2008), for instance,
estimate that between a quarter and a half of the workers in the United States
are employed in jobs where wages are posted. Similar results can also be found
2An overview of these models is given, for instance, in Rogerson, Shimer, and Randall
(2005).
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in earlier literature.3 Hence, although models with announced wages exhibit the
disputable feature of firms being committed to ignore counteroffers, empirical
evidence suggests that wage posting takes place to a significant extent.
Theoretical work uses the term “directed search” to describe labor markets
with posted wages. In directed-search models, workers typically face trade-offs
between higher wages and higher probabilities of getting a job. Thereby, credible
announcing of wages generally ensures constrained-efficient market outcomes,
whereas the “constraints” arise from the fact that workers cannot coordinate
their application behavior and, as a result, are forced to randomly pick some
employer. By introducing such coordination failures, frictions arise in these
models as well, but workers are directed towards efficient applying behavior,
since firms implicitly reveal their hiring probabilities by announcing wages.4
There exists, however, a branch within this literature which stresses potential
market failure, arising from the existence of heterogenous applicants. A series
of papers within the framework of Lang and Manove (2003) works out discretely
separated employment rates which are due to negligible differences in produc-
tivity. Similarily, Moen (2003) mentions unconditional wage announcements
and worker-firm specific productivities as a source of inefficiently low aggregate
3By showing that higher wages attract longer queues of applicants, the study of Holzer,
Katz, and Krueger (1991) implicitly implies that there is at least partial commitment on
behalf of the firms to refuse any kind of bargaining.
Along the same lines is the finding in Wial (1991) where it is described that chronic excess
supply of adequate candidates often coincides with jobs that are ex-ante considered to be
good ones, whereas the notion of “good” includes pay and is often passed on interpersonally.
4By assuming that firms are price-takers, Montgomery (1991) shows for the case of a
large labor market with identical applicants that employers endogenize the workers’ trade-off
between search intensity and wage, which ensures efficiency. Going one step further, but
omitting welfare considerations, Peters (1991) takes into account the effect of unilaterally
deviating firms by considering the limit case of an atomic economy. Based on these two
papers, Moen (1997) and Shimer (2001) introduce heterogeneity concerning the productivity
of vacant jobs and workers, respectively, whereby the equilibrium efficiency features of the
earlier developed models are maintained.
Analogous results, also concerning multiple worker types, are obtained in Coles and Eeck-
hout (2000) and Michelacci and Suarez (2006), where firms endogenously opt for posted wages
as opposed to auctions and bargaining.
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production. More specifically, Moen shows that low-productivity workers jeop-
ardize high-productivity workers to such an extent that firms are forced to raise
their posted wages in order to screen the market for superior productivities. Al-
though they are capable of doing so, in a separating equilibrium, the high-type
candidates’ employment probabilities turn out to be well below efficiency.
We adopt a similar idea in the following. But in contrast to the afore-mentioned
work, we introduce two innovations. First, we do not assume that firms can
only hire one applicant. Second, and more importantly, we take into consider-
ation that, upon being contacted, employers are not fully informed about their
candidates’ productivity. As opposed to existing work on directed search, we
proceed on the assumption that, once a firm is contacted, the hiring process
is not yet at its end. However, unlike work within the matching tradition, we
do not assume that the remaining interaction consists of negotiating on the
payment. Instead, we find it a more convincing assumption that job talks are
meant to evaluate the applicants’ abilities.
Imagine the following scenario. Firms post their salaries, say on the Internet
or in a newspaper. These binding offers are noticed by a large number of po-
tential employees who reflect on their relative prospects at the different firms.
Their productivities are private knowledge, but the candidates know that part
of this information becomes revealed once job interviews take place. Hence,
after the candidates choose a firm to submit their applications, employers ob-
tain additional information about a candidate’s type. A job interview may be
interpreted as a series of tasks, where a firm specifies a performance level which
the candidate needs to pass. Only successful applicants are hired. They receive
the salary which was promised at the outset.
Before firms use job talks as a sorting device, applicants on their part potentially
reveal their type by selecting a particular employer. Thus to determine the
beliefs of firms prior to job interviews, we have to examine a signaling game.
Accordingly, the inclusion of incomplete knowledge comes at the cost of off-the-
equilibrium-path beliefs which we need to construct. If firms deduce that lower
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salaries are rather selected by unproductive candidates, no applicant would head
to a low-paying job. But why should a firm—in our case off the equilibrium
path—make a conclusion of that kind? In the course of this chapter, we provide
an argument which rationalizes such a structure of beliefs.
Once employers expect that applicants uniformly approach the best-paying
firms, they are willing to outbid their opponents as long as they will find a
mixture of applicants which justifies such sizable salaries. But the higher the
promised payment is, the more thoroughly a firm needs to scrutinize its appli-
cants. As only the best are worth their price, most applicants are left without
an employment. Thus we find an explanation for the low hiring rates we referred
to at the beginning.
We organize the rest of the chapter as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe
the assumptions of the model. In Section 2.3, we look at a single firm (a
“monopsonist”) to illustrate the relation between salaries and the employment
rate. In Section 2.4, we present the results for the competitive case. We discuss a
more general specification of the interviewing process in Section 2.5. In Section
2.6, we provide a comparative statics analysis, contrast the market outcomes
with Pareto optimal allocations, and briefly address policy measures. In Section
2.7, we endogenize the firms’ off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs, which we impose
up to there. Section 2.8 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2.2 Model
We look at a continuum of applicants (candidates) with a total mass of 1.
θi ∈ {0, 1} denotes the value of the marginal product of applicant i. Thus
each candidate is either productive (θi = 1) or completely unproductive (θi =
0). Both types have an outside option of 0. There are J identical firms. To
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circumvent issues of market power, we let J →∞.5 We assume both applicants
and firms to be risk-neutral maximizers of their expected monetary payoffs.
The timing of the game is as follows. In period 1, nature chooses each applicant’s
productivity θi ∈ {0, 1}. With probability q1 = 1− q0, an individual applicant’s
productivity is 1. In period 2, each firm posts an unconditional salary wj
at which it obliges itself to pay accepted candidates. In period 3, candidates
simultaneously select firms. If the expected payoff is the same at several firms,
we assume that one of the most promising offers is picked randomly. In period
4, each applicant’s score value si is realized. In period 5, the contacted firms
decide on which applicants to employ.
Regarding period 4, we differentiate between two specifications:
Scenario 1. si = θi + εi, whereas εi ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2).
Scenario 2. si =
∑n
k=1 tk, whereas n ∈ N+ and tk ∈ {0, 1}. We define pi :=
P [tk = 1|θi] ∈ (0, 1), and assume that p1 > p0.
We discuss Scenario 1 in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Normally distributed score values
enable the firms to accurately control their composition of the workforce. In
fact, from the law of large numbers, this can be done to an arbitrarily precise
extent. In order to overcome this artificiality, in Section 2.5 we refer to Scenario
2, where we consider binomially distributed score values. By doing so, we
interpret {tk}nk=1 as a series of tasks which are examined in the course of a job
talk. From the number of successfully mastered tasks, a firm draws conclusions
about an applicant’s type. As the binomial distribution converges to a normal
distribution, Scenario 1 constitutes a special case of Scenario 2 where n → ∞.
Hence Scenario 2 is the more general framework.
By µ(wj), we denote the firms’ posterior belief that a candidate who approaches
firms with payment wj is of type 1. If candidates behave homogeneously, pos-
terior beliefs of the firms equal their prior beliefs, thus µ(wj) = q1. When
5As previously mentioned, we also look at the case of a single firm in the preliminary
Section 2.3, so as to separately study the role of job interviews.
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candidates behave heterogeneously, we assume firms to conclude that the high-
est accepted offer is only chosen by type-1 applicants, while any other offer is
only chosen by type-0 applicants. For the moment, we take this (obviously
strong) assumption as given. In Section 2.7, however, we show that it endoge-
nously arises as the consequence of a standard refinement criterion (“D1”). By
denoting by I the set of firms which are chosen by either applicant type with
positive probability, we summarize the structure of beliefs in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1.
∀j, l ∈ I : wj = wl ⇒ µ(wj) = µ(wl) = q1,
∃l ∈ I : wl < max
j∈I
{wj} ⇒ µ(max
j∈I
{wj}) = 1 and µ(wl) = 0.
2.3 The Monopsony Case
We first consider Scenario 1 with a single employer. In this case the analysis
of the applicants’ behavior becomes redundant since they have no alternative
to approaching the “monopsonist”. Accordingly, all applicants apply at the
monopsonist, as long as it offers wm ≥ 0. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium, the
monopsonist sets wm = 0, and all candidates end up being employed. Although
this result follows straightforwardly, we proceed by conducting a step-by-step
analysis of the game. The central aim of the following backwards induction is to
focus on the employer’s selection process, and to illustrate the relation between
salaries and employment probabilities.
The Hiring Decision At the final stage, the monopsonist decides on which
applicants to accept. Given it hires an applicant with a score value sm, it
also hires applicants with higher score values, because ∂P [θi = 1|si]/∂si >
0. Therefore, the monopsonist’s hiring problem can be reduced to finding the
profit-maximizing sm.
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Independently of wm ≥ 0, the employer expects an applicant to be of type
1 with probability q1 since, prior to the realization of the score value, nothing
about an applicant’s type has transpired. Hence, we can state the firm’s ex-post
profit maximization problem as
sm∗ = arg max
sm
{pi(sm)}
:= arg max
sm
{(1− Φ1[sm]) q1 − wj [(1− Φ1[sm]) q1
+ (1− Φ0[sm]) q0]} , (1)
where Φθi [·] denotes the cumulative distribution function of si(θi). The first-
order condition of problem (1) is
q1φ1(sm) != wm(q1φ1[sm] + q0φ0[sm]), (2)
where φθi [·] denotes the density function of si(θi).
The left-hand side of equation (2) is the marginal benefit from increasing sm:
the productive candidate’s density at sm times the ex-ante probability q1 of such
an applicant. The right-hand side of (2) is the marginal cost of increasing sm:
the marginal probability of hiring any applicant, q1φ1[sm]+q0φ0[sm], multiplied
by the salary wm.
By applying si ∼ i.i.d. N (θi, σ2) on (2), we obtain the monopsony’s optimal
threshold sm∗.
Lemma 1.
sm∗ = 12 + ln
(
q0
q1
wm
(1− wm)
)
σ2 (3)
Suppose, for instance, that q1 = q0 = 0.5 = wm = 0.5. In this case, the
monopsony obtains θi − wm = 0.5 per type-1 applicant and −0.5 per type-0
applicant. Therefore, as long as the marginal probability of hiring a type-1
applicant is above the marginal probability of hiring a type-0 applicant, the
firm wishes to decrease its lower bound sm to accept more candidates. The
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monopsonist reaches its optimum by setting the marginal probabilities equal
to each other. This is reflected in (3), which for the current example reads
sm∗ = 1/2 + ln(1)σ2 = 1/2.
The Choice of the Payment When choosing its payment offer, the monop-
sonist takes two effects into account. Ceteris paribus, an increasing payment
lowers the monopsonist’s profit. Through sm∗(wm), however, it also forces the
firm to adjust its composition of the workforce. By scaling up sm, the monop-
sonist increases its proportion of type-1 applicants. Equivalently,
lim
sm→∞ q1φ1[s
m] + q0φ0[sm] = q1φ1[sm] (4)
because limsm φ1[sm]/φ0[sm] = limsm e(2s
m−1)/2σ2 = ∞. Equation (4) and an
analogous statement for sm → −∞ imply that the monopsonist’s first-order
condition (2) has an interior solution whenever 0 < wm < 1. In Corollary
1 of Lemma 1, we rephrase this condition by turning our attention to corner
solutions. Furthermore, we state an analogous result regarding the impact of
the ex-ante distribution of types.
Corollary 1. In (3), limq1↘0 {sm∗(·)} = limwm↗1 {sm∗(·)} = ∞, as there are
either only type-0 candidates applying or wm is prohibitively high. Likewise,
limq1↗1 {sm∗(·)} = limwm↘0 {sm∗(·)} = −∞.
Of course, if the firm raises sm, it does not only affect the mixture of its work-
force but also its size. If the monopsonist sets wm = 0, its marginal cost, the
right-hand side of equation (2), equals 0. This allows it to set sm to −∞, thus
it accepts every applicant. As a result, the monopsonist realizes pim∗ = q1. We
state this result in Corollary 2 of Lemma 1.
Corollary 2. The monopsony sets wm∗ = arg maxwm{pim(wm)} = 0.
Welfare Analysis and Policy From a Utilitarian point of view, welfare
increases in the number of employed type-1 applicants, which in turn decreases
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with sm.6 By reconsidering equation (3), we see that
∂sm∗
∂wm
= σ
2
wm(1− wm) > 0. (5)
Hence the monopsonist’s behavior is in line with the one of a social planner.
The total surplus is q1.
Before shifting the focus of the analysis to a market with many employers, we
briefly look at potential government interventions in the monopsony case.
Minimum Salary From equation (5), a minimum salary lowers the amount of
hired type-1 applicants. Utilitarian welfare is reduced.
Maximum Salary Since the monopsonist chooses wm∗ = 0, any restriction from
above is without consequences.
2.4 The Competitive Case
As opposed to the analysis of the previous section, we now consider the case
with J →∞ employers. As a consequence, we have to deal with a combination
of a screening game and a signaling game. Screening occurs at the outset: firms
try to influence the composition of their workforce by offering their respective
salaries. Signaling occurs subsequently: each applicant faces an array of salary
offers; thus by approaching a particular firm, it becomes possible to convey a
signal. Respecting this setting of incomplete information, we use the notion of
a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (henceforth PBE): at each stage of the game,
agents maximize their payoffs given their beliefs, which are consistent in equi-
librium. Regarding off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs, we impose Assumption 1,
which we endogenize in Section 2.7. As before, we proceed by solving the game
backwards.
6The cumulative distribution function of a normally distributed variable is strictly increas-
ing in its argument.
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The Hiring Decision At the final stage, each firm deliberates on which
applicants it accepts to employ. Firm j’s decision depends on its salary offer,
wj, and its belief on its applicants type, µ(w). Thereby, w := (wj, w−j) denotes
the vector of all salaries offered in the first period. That is, upon observing the
entire array of salary offers and receiving a certain amount of applicants, firm j
assesses its applicants to be of type 1 with probability µ(w) and of type 2 with
probability 1− µ(w).
Apart from this, the analysis of the hiring decision in the competitive case
mirrors the one in case of a monopsonistic employer, discussed in Section 2.3.
As a result, we obtain an individual firm’s optimal threshold s∗j .
Lemma 2.
s∗j =
1
2 + ln
(
(1− µ(w))
µ(w)
wj
(1− wj)
)
σ2 (6)
According to Lemma 2, s∗j increases in the fraction of type-0 applicants, in firm
j’s offered salary, as well as in the variance of the signal distribution.7 Also
referring to Section 2.3, we summarize the limit behavior of s∗j as follows.
Corollary 3. In (6), limµ(w)↘0
{
s∗j(·)
}
= limwj↗1
{
s∗j(·)
}
= ∞, as either j
expects only type-0 candidates applying or wj is prohibitively high. Likewise,
limµ(w)↗1
{
s∗j(·)
}
= limwj↘0
{
s∗j(·)
}
= −∞.
The Selection of a Firm To determine µ(w), we have to consider the appli-
cants’ selection of employers in period 3. Each candidate i selects firm j∗ which
maximizes his or her expected payoff. That is,
(j∗|θi) = arg max
j
{
wjP [si ≥ s∗j(·)|θi]
}
. (7)
In (7), the probability that firm j accepts applicant i, P [si ≥ s∗j(·)|θi], depends
on the employers belief µ(w) (through s∗j). From Assumption 1, we have that
7As an exception, s∗j is independent of σ2 if wj(1 − µ(w)) = (1 − wj)µ(w). In this case,
s∗j = 1/2.
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i is believed to be a type-0 applicant whenever i approaches an employer with
an offer below the maximum offer among all selected firms. Furthermore, from
Corollary 3, such a firm will never accept a positive amount of applicants when-
ever it offers a positive salary. As a result, the applicants only choose among
the employers with the highest salary offers.
Lemma 3. For θi ∈ {0, 1},
(j∗|θi) ∈ K : ∀k ∈ K : wk = max
j
{wj},
and each candidate randomly picks one of the firms in K.
Given the other applicants go for a firm with the highest salary offer, no indi-
vidual applicant wants to be exposed as being of the low productivity type 0.
Similarly, if some candidates select a firm which does not belong to the set of
firms with the highest offer, there is an incentive for each applicant to go for
the highest offer and to be declared as being of type 1.
The Choice of the Offered Salary Being aware of the subsequent equi-
librium behavior, in the initial state each firm j offers salary wj in order to
maximize its expected profit. Proposition 1 states that in equilibrium the max-
imum offered salary cannot be smaller than 1.
Proposition 1. In the PBE, it holds that
@wˆ < 1 : ∀j ∈ J : wj ≤ wˆ.
The proof of Proposition 1 is somewhat cumbersome.8 In order to understand
its message, it suffices to consider a counterfactual example where the highest
8Whereas this proof and its counterpart regarding Proposition 2 treat firms as only being
able to choose among pure strategies, extensions to mixed strategies such as done in the proof
of Lemma 3 would be straightforward. We impose the restriction to pure strategies to ease
notation, and because the results are unaffected.
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offered salary is, say, 0.99. For the sake of the argument, assume that all firms
offer this salary. As a result, and since we focus on J → ∞, an individual
employer obtains 0. By increasing its offer, for example, to 0.991, an individual
firm l can achieve to become the only employer contacted by the candidates
(see Lemma 3). Does such a deviation pay off? In order to see why this is true,
be aware that once the workers have contacted firm l, according to (6), l sets
s∗l =
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
0.991
0.009
)
σ2,
which is approximately 5.2 for q0 = q1 and σ2 = 1. As a consequence,
P [si ≥ 5.2|θi] '
0.0000001 for θi = 0,0.0000134 for θi = 1.
Thus, by choosing s∗l = 5.2, firm l ensures that its ratio between productive and
unproductive workers is roughly 134:1. That is, for each type-0 worker which
leaves the firm with a loss of 0.991, it hires 134 type-1 applicants, on each of
which it obtains a margin of 0.009. As a result, l’s profit per 135 employed
candidates is 134× 0.009− 0.901 = 0.215.
That is, for wj < 1, it is always feasible to steer the ratio between accepted
type-1 and type-0 applicants towards the desired direction. This has, however,
detrimental effects on the employment rate, as we point out in the following
corollary.
Corollary 4. In the PBE, we have maxj {wj} = 1, and both the employment
rate and profits are 0.
Of course, in its present form, this result is too crude to match the observed
pattern. In the following, we show that the reason for this lies in the continuos
space of the score values. With discrete score values, any employment rate is
possible, although we approach the result of Corollary 4 the more we refine the
domain of possible score values.
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2.5 Generalization of the Competitive Case
In contrast to above, we now assume that only coarse signals about productivity
are transmitted. We accordingly modify all so-far conducted steps.
The Hiring Decision Once a firm expects to face µ(w) type-1 candidates and
1− µ(w) type-0 ones, it is confronted with the same trade-off as in Section 2.4.
If the minimum-requirement level sj is excessively high, a lot of productivity is
lost because both applicant types are rejected. If it is modest, the firm employs
too many type-0 candidates on which it loses. Correspondingly, the higher is
wj, the higher sj has to be. In fact, in the following we show that in a PBE each
firm’s salary offer wj is insomuch high that only the fulfillment of the highest
possible threshold sj = n gives rise to an employment.
As a first step to seeing that, consider that, in contrast to the above case, the
distinguishing assumption of Scenario 2 implies that the signal of each applicant
can only take on integer values within a bounded set. Specifically, signal si(θi)
follows a binomial distribution and thus assumes the probability mass function
P [si = k|θi] =
(
n
k
)
pθi(1 − pθi)n−k, where pθi denotes the constant probability
that an single of n assessed tasks is successfully handled by candidate i with
θi ∈ {0, 1}. In analogy to (1), we state the ex-post profit maximization problem
of firm j as
s∗j = arg max
sj∈N0

n∑
k=sj
(
n
k
) [
(1− wj)µ(w)pk1(1− p1)n−k
−wj (1− µ(w)) pk0(1− p0)n−k
]}
. (8)
Due to the discreteness of problem (8), first-order conditions are of no help here.
Nevertheless, Lemma 4 provides a sufficient condition for s∗j = n, whereas in the
course of the proof of Proposition 2 we point out that the requested condition
always holds.
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Lemma 4. Assume there exists a unique solution for s∗j . Then, for µ(w) ∈
(0, 1), we have
∀j ∈ J : wj1− wj ≥
µ(w)
1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)n
⇒ s∗j = n. (9)
Thus the obligation of paying a high salary wj forces firm j to investigate more
thoroughly whether an applicant is of type 1. Furthermore, if the values of
p1 and p0 are close together, and if there are relatively few type-1 applicants
expected, it is particularly important to let a candidate accomplish as many
assessment tasks as possible.
The Selection of a Firm Regarding the choice of a firm, the former analysis
involving an unbounded and continuous signal space carries over to the present
setting with bounded and discrete test scores. A replicated proof of Lemma 3
would merely adjust the probability of being accepted at firm j in the case of
homogenous behavior of the applicants to
P [si ≥ n|si ∼ Binomial(n, pθi)] = pnθi ∈ (0, 1),
leaving the remainder of the discussion unaffected. Therefore we omit a repeti-
tion of the proof.
The Choice of the Offered Salary Again, by choosing a salary wj, firm j
has to take the sequential consequences on µ(w) and s∗j(·) into account. Propo-
sition 2 provides a simple decision rule for the firms in period 1. It states that, in
contrast to the case of a continuous signal space, the maximum salary chosen in
the initial period can be, and generally is, below 1, even though it approaches
1 for n → ∞. Since the proof of Proposition 2 makes use of Lemma 4, we
need to scrutinize the condition stated in (9) each time we apply the lemma,
irrespective of whether it is on or off the equilibrium path.9
9Otherwise, we would risk running into a circular argument.
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Proposition 2. In the PBE, we have
max
j
{wj} = q1p
n
1
q1pn1 + q0pn0
=: w∗. (10)
In the proof of Proposition 2, we show that in any constellation where the
highest offered salary is not equal to w∗ there are incentives for at least one
firm to either increase or decrease its offer. Here, we only sketch out that there
actually exists a PBE which involves a maximum salary as described in (10).
To see this, note that
w∗
1− w∗ =
q1p
n
1
q0pn0
= µ(w)1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)n
,
whereas the later equality follows from the random assignment of candidates to
jobs that offer w∗ and Assumption 1 about the structure of beliefs. It follows
from condition (9) in Lemma 4 that, upon offering w∗, firm j requires its candi-
dates to pass the maximum number of tasks, n. From the binomial distribution
of the score values, the odds of passing n tasks and becoming employed is pnθi ,
θi ∈ {0, 1}. Accordingly, each firm’s profit is
(1− w∗)q1pn1 − w∗q0pn0 = 0.
Given all competing firms offer w∗, there is no incentive to deviate by announc-
ing a higher salary: all applicants would accept the deviating firm’s offer, and
the latter would end up with a loss. Similarly, cutting the offered salary is use-
less, as Assumption 1 guarantees that all applicants approach the best-paying
firm in order to not reveal themselves as type-0 candidates.
As Proposition 2 indicates, not all firms necessarily make identical offers. As
long as the highest offered salary equals w∗, each firm obtains zero profit, re-
gardless of whether it attracts applicants or not. However, for instance under
the restriction of symmetric firm behavior, w∗ is the unique offered salary in a
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PBE. Hence, for simplicity, in the remainder of this chapter we assume that in
equilibrium wj = w∗ for all firms j ∈ J .
We close this section with Corollary 5 of Proposition 2 regarding the employ-
ment rate and expected payoffs.
Corollary 5. In the PBE, the probability of an applicant of type θi to become
employed is pnθi. Accordingly, the population-wide employment rate is (q1p
n
1 +
q0p
n
0 )/(q1 + q0), and the expected payoff of an applicant with productivity θi is
(pnθiq1p
n
1 )/(q1pn1 + q0pn0 ).
2.6 Welfare and Policy
Regarding total surplus, it solely matters how many workers are employed in
equilibrium. Irrespective of informational issues, full employment of productive
candidates can be achieved by enforcing sj = mini {si}, alongside wj ∈ [0, 1],
for each firm j. Such constrained-efficient allocations are also Pareto optimal,
as is, among others, the monopsonist’s solution.
In Table 2.1, we compare values of the model’s key variables for both considered
scenarios with the outcome of the monopsonist’s problem. In both scenarios a
Outcomes
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Monopsony
Maximum salary 1 ∈
(
q1
q1+q0 , 1
)
0
Employment rate 0 ∈ (0, 1) 1
Fraction of type-1 employees 1 (limit) ∈
(
q1
q1+q0 , 1
)
q1
q1+q0
Producer surplus (applicants) 0 ∈ (0, q1) 0
Consumer surplus (firms) 0 0 q1
Table 2.1: Comparative statics
monopsonist j chooses a salary as low as possible, and at the same time it
60 CHAPTER 2. SELECTION UPON WAGE POSTING
hires as many applicants i with θi = 1 as possible. Respecting the candidates’
individual-rationality constraints which impose wj ≥ 0, these two objectives
are not competing. With wj = 0, all applicants apply at j. Thereupon, due
to sj = mini {si}, all candidates, including the productive ones, are employed.
Regarding the profit maximizing threshold, we have s∗j = −∞ in Scenario 1
with a continuous and unbounded signal space, and s∗j = 0 in Scenario 2 with
an atomic, bounded distribution. Ignoring equity considerations due to transfer
payments, the monopsony maximizes overall welfare.
Under competition, the main difference between the two scenarios is that in
Scenario 2 the firms do not have illimitable means to sort out type-0 applicants
by raising sj. Anticipating this, they are not willing to set their salary offers
arbitrarily close to 1 in the initial period. Therefore, the odds of becoming
employed are non-zero for both types of candidates. With discrete score values,
the applicants’ surplus is
w∗ (q1P [si ≥ n|θi = 1] + q0P [si ≥ n|θi = 0])
= q1p
n
1
q1pn1 + q0pn0
(q1pn1 + q0pn0 ) = q1pn1 .
Accordingly, overall welfare is higher for values of p1 closer to 1 and a lower
number of testing criteria n. That is, the coarser the firms’ framework for the
assessment of the candidates, the more likely it is that candidates withstand
even the highest classification requirement. This is reflected in a higher employ-
ment rate.
Policy Since n and, through the difficulty level of the assessment tasks, p1 are
parameters which are generically determined within firms, they are no adequate
means of regulation. It is, however, plausible that policy-makers restrict the
range of wj. In fact, it is easy to see that by upwards restricting wj ≤ w,
any measure of unemployment can be eliminated by appropriately choosing w.
Thus in our stylized model, lowering w from its equilibrium value leads to a
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Pareto improvement, because firms become enabled to extract a positive profit,
whereas an applicant of type θi obtains wP [si ≥ s∗j(w)|θi].
The preference ordering of firms and applicants over possible values of w, how-
ever, is not aligned. Consider Scenario 1. Regarding firm j’s profit,
pij(w) =
(
1− Φ1[sj(w)]
) q1
J
− w
[(
1− Φ1[sj(w)]
) q1
J
+
(
1− Φ0[sj(w)]
) q0
J
]
,
we apply the regular envelope theorem to see that the impact of an increase in
w on j’s payoff is
∂pij(·)
∂w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
sj(w)=s∗j (w)
= −
[(
1− Φ1[s∗j(w)]
) q1
J
+
(
1− Φ0[s∗j(w)]
) q0
J
]
,
thus strictly negative for all w ∈ [0, 1). As opposed to this, for both candidate
types there exists a clear-cut and positive optimal upper bound on salaries.
Proposition 3. When salaries are restricted by wj ≤ w, for each applicant
type θi ∈ {0, 1} there exists a unique wθi which satisfies
wθi = arg max
w
{
wP [si ≥ s∗j(w)|θi]
}
. (11)
Furthermore, w1 > w0; and type-θi applicants’ payoffs are strictly increasing in
w if and only if 0 ≤ w < wθi.
Consider Figure 2.1. Each value of w implicitly defines a candidate’s employ-
ment probability. The thick lines in panel (a) thus constitute “budget lines” for
both candidate types. Crucially, the implicit employment probability decreases
in the posted salary, but faster so for type-0 applicants. Therefore, with any
w, type-1 applicants have higher expected payoffs than type-0 applicants, as we
show in panel (b). In addition, the highest payoff is achieved at a higher value
of w for type-1 applicants, as can be seen in both panels.
Somewhat surprisingly, when it comes to determining w, the preference order
of type-0 workers is better aligned with the preference order of firms. The only
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Figure 2.1: Determination of w1 and w0
party which remotely benefits from not having a salary ceiling is the type-1
applicants.
2.7 Endogenization of Beliefs
In both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, the signaling behavior of the applicants
clearly drives the main results. Specifically, from Assumption 1 it follows that
all candidates necessarily approach the best-paying firm, because otherwise they
would—correctly or mistakenly—reveal themselves as being of the unproductive
type 0. Obviously, this is a strong assumption, which we imposed axiomatically
up to now. Thus we owe it to the reader to provide an appropriate motivation.
In the following, we consider Scenario 1. We examine to what extent two
established refinements for signaling games apply. To begin with, consider the
equilibrium outcome where both candidate types choose a firm k with wk =
maxj {wj} = 1.
Refinement 1. The “Intuitive Criterion” by Cho and Kreps (1987) eliminates
equilibria where firms asses the probability that an off-the-equilibrium-path
message is sent by an applicant for whom sending it is dominated by the equi-
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librium strategy to be non-zero. Accordingly, the equilibrium profile survives
the Intuitive Criterion if and only if the remaining type of applicant does not
strictly benefit from sending the off-the-equilibrium-path message.
In the present model, it only pays off for an applicant to deviate from the equi-
librium strategy (that is, heading for wl < wk instead of wk = 1) if this induces
a higher probability of becoming employed. From Lemma 2, the employment
probability of a type-θi applicant is
1− Φθi
[
1
2 + ln
(
(1− µ(w))
µ(w)
wl
(1− wl)
)
σ2
]
, (12)
which is positive for µ(w) > 0 and wl < 1. Since in equilibrium both candidate
types have a payoff of 0, the firms cannot exclude either of them upon receiving
such a message. Hence the proposed equilibrium does not violate the Intuitive
Criterion.
Refinement 2. The ‘“D1 Criterion” by Banks and Sobel (1987) is more restrictive
in as much as it constrains the firms to eliminate types which are “less likely”
than others to send particular off-the-equilibrium-path messages. That is, upon
observing an applicant to approach a firm offering wl < wk, the firms deduce
that the deviating candidate is of the type for whom deviating is profitable in
a higher number of cases, characterized by µ(w).
For wl = 0, irrespectively of µ(w), it does never pay off to deviate for either
type. For 0 < wl < 1, (12) implies that, for both types, the set of µ(w) which
rewards departure from wk = 1 is given by µ(w) ∈ (0, 1). Thus M1 = M0, and
neither is a proper superset of the other. Therefore, we cannot further restrict
off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs, which leaves the D1 Criterion—as well as the
Intuitive Criterion—without bite.
So far we focussed on the case where the highest offered salary is 1 and thus no
applicant is employed in equilibrium. However, there are many more subgames
to consider, each of them being a signaling game with a fixed distribution of
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{wj}j∈J . For each of these subgames, we now show that the beliefs imposed in
Assumption 5 necessarily arise under the D1 Criterion.10
Lemma 5. Denote by k a firm with wk = maxj {wj} and by l a firm with
wl < wk in any subgame. Let Mθ be the set of beliefs µ(w) for which
P [si ≥ s∗l (µ(w), wl)|θi = θ]wl > P [si ≥ s∗k(wk)|θi = θ]wk, (13)
where s∗k(wk) is the equilibrium value complying with Lemma 3 and the further
course of the game. Then M1 ⊂M0.
That is, each µ(w) which gives type-1 applicants an incentive to deviate from
their putative equilibrium strategies also induces type-0 applicants to do so.
The same, however, does not apply the other way around.
Consider Figure 2.1. In order for µ(w) ∈ M1, wl must be associated with a
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Figure 2.1: Relative probabilities of becoming employed
10Accordingly, they satisfy the Intuitive Criterion as well.
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sufficient increase in the likelihood of a type-1 applicant to become employed.
Such a candidate compares the relation of hiring probabilities, indicated in
panels (a) and (b), with the relative wage wk/wl. Specifically, in the proof of
Lemma 5 we show that if the proportion P [si ≥ s∗l |θi = 1]/P [si ≥ s∗k|θi = 1]
exceeds wk/wl, the same must be true for P [si ≥ s∗l |θi = 0]/P [si ≥ s∗k|θi = 0].
In terms of Figure 2.1, this means that whenever the shaded area in panel (a)
is sufficiently large as compared with the shaded area in panel (b), the same
necessarily holds with regard to the relation between the indicated areas in
panels (c) and (d). Therefore, each µ(w) which satisfies (13) with respect to
θ = 1 also satisfies (13) with respect to θ = 0, but the opposite is not true. As a
result, firm l which offers the lower salary wl infers that its applicants are likelier
to be of type 0. The D1 Criterion then requires firm l to rule out the possibility
of being approached by a type-1 candidate. From Corollary 3 of Lemma 2, it
eventually follows that the probability of being hired at firm l is 0. Accordingly,
there are no incentives for either candidate to apply at lower-paying firms. This
justifies the structure of the off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs which we impose in
Assumption 1.
2.8 Conclusion
In contrast to the existing literature on directed job search, the equilibria we
presented in this chapter exhibit tremendous inefficiencies. Due to “D1 con-
siderations”, applicants only approach the best-paying firms. Therefore, firms
incur Bertrand-style outbidding. In retrospect, this forces them to excessively
raise their hiring thresholds, which leads to unemployment.
To be clear, our results are far too extreme for the purpose of interpreting them
in a “literal” manner. For the sake of highlighting a subtle but potentially crucial
emergence, we made a number of simplifications. Regarding future research, it
thus would be of interest to address some of the following issues in greater detail.
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First, we assume homogenous firms. This may not pose a problem concerning
the analysis of a specific market. However, within a more comprehensive frame-
work, applicants would differ with respect to their outside opportunities includ-
ing alternative job offers and unemployment benefits. Once we endogenized
their participation constraints, the mechanism which deteriorates expected em-
ployment probabilities might be mitigated.
Secondly, if we abandoned the imposed dichotomy regarding the applicants’
productivity, we would also have to adjust the firms’ hiring rules and the spec-
ification of their beliefs. Discrete jumps in the value of the marginal product,
which are essential to the discussed phenomena, are more probable to arise at
the less densely populated upper part of the distribution. Therefore we may
suppose that the examined effect plays a more important role within this range.
Of course, there exists a wide array of other possible extensions, such as on-the-
job search (Delacroix and Shi, 2006), endogenized waging-rule determination
(Michelacci and Suarez, 2006), job destruction, multiple applications, multi-
period problems, learning processes, and many more. Incorporating these in
a model of incomplete knowledge issues serious challenges. Replacing the nor-
mally distributed score values by some easier tractable random variables could
be an option to counteract formal difficulties.
The above points make clear that our model is intended to serve as a starting
point, indicating a potential direction of research, and not as a tool with pre-
dictive power. In its current state, it is neither appropriate for policy advice.
In particular, implications of measures such as a salary ceiling strongly depend
on institutional factors such as the international environment.
We showed, however, that a job-market model with imperfect observability of
type is analytically tractable, and the arising PBE exhibits some properties
which are well worth noting. In contrast to most of the existing literature, we
pointed out that a directed-search equilibrium can be far from efficient, and that
both job-seekers and—even more—firms may be keen on taking some action.
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2.A Appendices to Chapter 2
2.A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
From
φ1(sm) =
1√
2piσ2
e−
(sm−1)2
2σ2 and φ0(sm) =
1√
2piσ2
e−
(sm)2
2σ2 ,
we write (2) as
q1(1− wj)e−
(sm−1)2
2σ2 = wjq0e−
−(sm)2
2σ2 .
Upon taking logarithms and rearranging, we obtain (3). For wm ∈ (0, 1) and q1 ∈ (0, 1),
sm(·) is well-defined and continuous in its arguments. Furthermore, the expected profit is
positive at sm∗, zero for sm(·)→∞, and negative for sm(·)→ −∞. Therefore condition (3)
is not only necessary but also sufficient for sm∗ being a global maximizer.
2.A.2 Proof of Corollary 2
The monopsonist maximizes
pim(wm) = (1− Φ1[sm(wm)])q1 − wj [(1− Φ1[sm(wm)])q1 + (1− Φ0[sm(wm)])q0] .
From wm ≥ 0, it is sufficient to show that pim(wm) decreases in wm once we impose sm(wm) =
sm∗(wm) (from subgame perfection). By applying the regular envelope theorem, we observe
that, as wm increases, the change in the monopsonist’s profit is
∂pim(wm, sm(wm))
∂wm
∣∣∣∣∣
sm(wm)=sm∗(wm)
= − (1− Φ1[sm∗(wm)]) q1 − (1− Φ0[sm∗(wm)]) q0,
which is strictly negative for any wm ∈ [0, 1).
2.A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose to the contrary that for either θi = 0 or θi = 1 (or both) it holds that (j∗|θi) /∈ K
with some positive probability p. If a firm l ∈ L = J\K gets contacted by such a candidate,
it infers from Assumption 1 that µ(w) = 0. From (6), l sets s∗l = ∞. Thus it holds for the
deviating applicant’s expected payoff that
p× wlP [si >∞|θi] + (1− p)× wk = (1− p)× wk < wk.
On the other hand, if an individual candidate opts for k ∈ K, the off-the-equilibrium-path
beliefs of firm k ensure that s∗k = −∞ and the expected payoff of the applicant is wk.
Alternatively, suppose that all candidates approach firms within L. In this case, applicant i’s
expected payoff is
wlP [si > s∗l (·)|θi] ≤ wl < wk.
If applicant i deviates to firm k, he or she would (wrongly or rightly) be identified as being
of type 1, thus earning wk for sure.
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Finally, it does not pay to deviate from the suggested equilibrium, as only downwards devi-
ations are possible. By doing so, a candidate would be interpreted as being of type 0, thus
earning nothing.
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Case 1. Suppose to the contrary that ∀j ∈ J : wj = wˆ < 1. For a finite number J of firms,
it holds from (6) that each firm’s profit is
pij(wˆ) = (1− wˆ)
(
1− Φ1
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
wˆ
1− wˆ
)
σ2
])
q1
J
− wˆ
(
1− Φ0
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
wˆ
1− wˆ
)
σ2
])
q0
J
.
As J → ∞, we have pij(wˆ) → 0 for any wˆ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, with a continuum of firms, we
solely remain to show that it is possible for a single firm to get a positive profit by deviating
regarding the offered salary. Since wˆ < 1, there exists an ε > 0 such that 1−ε > wˆ. Therefore,
it is possible for a single firm l to set wl = 1− ε and thereby achieve a profit of
pil(wl) = ε
(
1− Φ1
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
1− ε
ε
)
σ2
])
q1
− (1− ε)
(
1− Φ0
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
1− ε
ε
)
σ2
])
q0
]
.
=: ε(1− Φ1[·])q1 − (1− ε)(1− Φ0[·])q0. (A.1)
We next show that pil(wl) > 0, or, from (A.1),
q1
q0
ε
1− ε >
1− Φ0[·]
1− Φ1[·] , (A.2)
for ε > 0 sufficiently small. Since limε↘0 {q1ε/q0(1− ε)} = 0, it is necessary for (A.2) that
lim
ε↘0
{
1− Φ0[·]
1− Φ1[·]
}
= 0. (A.3)
In order to show (A.3), we apply l’Hôpital’s rule, as in the limit both the numerator and the
denominator of the fraction at hand are 0, because for θ ∈ {0, 1} it holds that limε↘0 Φθ[·] = 1.
According to l’Hôpital,
lim
ε↘0
{
1− Φ0[·]
1− Φ1[·]
}
= lim
ε↘0
{
∂(1−Φ0[·])
∂ε
∂(1−Φ1[·])
∂ε
}
= lim
ε↘0
φ0
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
1−ε
ε
)
σ2
]
φ1
[
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
1−ε
ε
)
σ2
]
 , (A.4)
2.A. APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2 69
By employing si ∼ i.i.d. N (θi, σ2), we rewrite (A.4) as
lim
ε↘0

exp
(
−
[
ln
(
q0
q1
(1−ε)
ε
)
σ2+ 12
]2
2σ2
)
exp
(
−
[
ln
(
q0
q1
(1−ε)
ε
)
σ2− 12
]2
2σ2
)

= lim
ε↘0
{
exp
[
− ln
(
q0
q1
(1− ε)
ε
)]}
= lim
ε↘0
{
q1
q0
ε
(1− ε)
}
= 0,
which is the required necessary condition. In order to find a sufficient condition for (A.2), we
use l’Hôpital’s rule a second time. Specifically, we need
lim
ε↘0
{
∂ q1q0
ε
1−ε
∂ε
}
> lim
ε↘0
∂
1−Φ0[·]
1−Φ1[·]
∂ε
 . (A.5)
The left-hand side of (A.5),
lim
ε↘0
{
q1
q0
1
(1− ε)2
}
,
is positive. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that this does not hold for its right-hand side,
which we rewrite as
lim
ε↘0
{
[(−φ0(·))(1− Φ1[·]) + φ1(·)(1− Φ0[·])] 1ε(1−ε)
(1− Φ1[·])2
}
. (A.6)
(A.6) is negative if φ0(·)(1−Φ1[·]) > φ1(·)(1−Φ0[·]). De novo, we use l’Hôpital’s rule to show
that
lim
ε↘0
{
φ0(·)
φ1(·)
}
> lim
ε↘0
{
1− Φ0[·]
1− Φ1[·]
}
⇔ lim
ε↘0
{
1
1− ε
}
> lim
ε↘0
{ε} ,
which completes the proof for the first case.
Case 2. Suppose now that there are multiple offered wages, whereas wˆ := maxj{wj} < 1.
Consider firm l which offers w˜l such that 0 ≤ w˜l < wˆ. From Lemma 3 it follows that no
worker applies at l, leaving l’s profit to be zero. However, as it was argued in the course of
Case 1, there exists a wage wl ∈ (wˆ, 1), which yields a positive profit. Therefore, w˜l cannot
be a best answer from the beginning.
2.A.5 Proof of Corollary 4
The first fact directly follows from (1). Then, from Lemma 3, applicants of both types
θi ∈ {0, 1} choose firm j∗ such that
(j∗|θi) ∈ K : ∀k ∈ K : wk = 1.
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In this case, equilibrium belief formation as stated in Assumption 1 ensures that (1 −
µ(w))/µ(w) = q0/q1. Furthermore,
(s∗j |wj = 1) = lim
wj↗1
{
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
wj
(1− wj)
)
σ2
}
=∞.
Hence in equilibrium no candidate will be hired.
2.A.6 Proof of Lemma 4
From (8), the difference in firm j’s profit between the two cases sj = s ∈ N and sj = s− 1 is
∆pij(s, w) := pij(s, w)− pij(s− 1, w)
=
(
n
s
)[
wj (1− µ(w)) ps0(1− p0)n−s
− (1− wj)µ(w)ps1(1− p1)n−s
]
. (A.7)
By rearranging (A.7), we obtain that ∆pij(s, w) is non-negative as long as
wj
1− wj ≥
µ(w)
1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)s(1− p1
1− p0
)n−s
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:κ(·)>0
. (A.8)
The derivative of the right-hand side of (A.8), κ(·) with respect to s is
∂κ(·)
∂s
= ln
(
p1
(1− p1)
(1− p0)
p0
)
κ(·),
which is positive, since p1 > p0. Therefore, if (A.8) holds for the highest possible value of s,
n, it implicitly holds for lower values of s as well. That is,
wj
1− wj ≥
µ(w)
1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)n
⇒ ∀s ∈ N ≤ n : ∆pij(s, w) ≥ 0. (A.9)
From the uniqueness assumption with regard to s∗j , (A.9) completes the proof.
2.A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Case 1. Suppose to the contrary that ∀j ∈ J : wj = wˆ < w∗. Independently from the choice
of s∗j , with J → ∞ we have pij(wˆ) → 0, since applicants choose among all firms with equal
probability.
Since wˆ < w∗, there exists an ε > 0 such that w∗− ε := w˜l > wˆ can be offered by a deviating
firm l. From Assumption 1, all applicants select l and thus µ(w) = q1 and (1− µ(w)) = q0
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(see Lemma 3). From the profit function (8) with sj = n, it then follows that
pil(w˜l) = (1− w˜l)q1pn1 − w˜lq0pn0
= (1− w∗ + ε)q1pn1 − (w∗ − ε)q0pn0
=
(
q0p
n
0
q1pn1 + q0pn0
+ ε
)
q1p
n
1 −
(
q1p
n
1
q1pn1 + q0pn0
− ε
)
q0p
n
0
= ε(q1pn1 + q0pn0 ) > 0.
As it is sufficient to show that l obtains a profit by choosing sj = n, the result does not hinge
on condition (9) in Lemma 4.
Case 2. Suppose now that there are multiple offered salaries with wˆ := maxj{wj} < w∗.
Consider firm l which offers wl < wˆ. As before, it follows Assumption 1 (and Lemma 3) that
no applicant chooses firm l, leaving l without a profit. By referring to Case 1, it holds that
there exists an offer w˜l ∈ (wˆ, w∗) which yields a positive profit. Therefore, wl cannot be a
best answer.
Case 3. Finally suppose that the highest offer is above w∗. By denoting that highest salary
by wl := w∗ + ε, it follows that
wl
1− wl >
w∗
1− w∗ =
q1p
n
1
q0pn0
= µ(w)1− µ(w)
(
p1
p0
)n
, (A.10)
whereas q1q0 =
µ(w)
1−µ(w) results from the random assignment of workers to firms offering wl.
According to Lemma 4, the inequality in (A.10) ensures that s∗l = n at the final stage. Let
the number of firms which offer wl be L. Since for each firm l ∈ L it applies that µ(wl) = q1L
and (1− µ(wl)) = q0L , their equilibrium profit reads
pil(wl) = (1− w∗ − ε)q1p
n
1
L
− (w∗ + ε)q0p
n
0
L
=
(
q0p
n
0
q1pn1 + q0pn0
− ε
)
q1p
n
1
L
−
(
q1p
n
1
q1pn1 + q0pn0
+ ε
)
q0p
n
0
L
= − ε
L
(q1pn1 + q0pn0 ) < 0.
Since each l ∈ L could avoid losses by choosing w˜l < wl, wl cannot be a best answer.
2.A.8 Proof of Proposition 3
With a salary ceiling w, the threshold for an applicant’s score value at any firm j is
sj(w) =
1
2 + ln
(
q0
q1
w
(1− w)
)
σ2. (A.11)
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By incorporating the subsequent course of the game, we write (11) as
wθi = arg max
w
{
w
(
1− Φθi
[
sj(w)
])}
= arg max
w
{
w
(
1− Φ0
[
sj(w)− θi
])}
. (A.12)
From (A.11), it follows that the first-order condition to problem (A.12) is
1− Φ0
[
sj − θi
]
= φ0(sj − θi)
σ2
1− w,
which we write as
σ2
1− w =
∫ ∞
s
j
−θi
φ0(t)
φ0(sj − θi)
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
φ0(sj − θi + u)
φ0(sj − θi)
du
=
∫ ∞
0
e
− u22σ2−
(
1
2+ln
(
q0
q1
w
(1−w)
)
σ2−θi
)
u
σ2 du. (A.13)
The left-hand side of (A.13) equals σ2 for w = 0, then continuously and strictly increases,
and approaches infinity for w ↗ 1. Meanwhile, its right-hand side approaches infinity for
w ↘ 0, then strictly and continuously decreases, and converges to 0 as w ↗ 1. Since the
objective function is positive at an interior solution, (A.13) uniquely determines wθi . Since
the expected payoff is 0 at both w = 0 and w = 1 and its derivative is 0 only at wθi , it also
holds that the objective function increases for values below wθi and decreases for values above
wθi . Finally, since the right-hand side of (A.13) increases in θi, we have w1 > w0.
2.A.9 Proof of Lemma 5
We express (13) as
P [si ≥ s∗l (µ(w), wl)|θi = θ]
P [si ≥ s∗k(wk)|θi = θ]
=: 1− Φθ[κ]1− Φθ[κ+ ∆] >
wk
wl
,
where it follows from wk > wl that ∆ > 0. Thereby,
1− Φ0[κ]
1− Φ0[κ+ ∆] >
1− Φ1[κ]
1− Φ1[κ+ ∆] =
1− Φ0[κ− 1]
1− Φ0[κ+ ∆− 1] (A.14)
implies that
µ(w) ∈M1 ⇒ µ(w) ∈M0.
For (A.14) to be true for arbitrary κ and ∆ > 0, it is sufficient to show that
∂ 1−Φ0[κ]1−Φ0[κ+∆]
∂κ
> 0 ⇔ ∂ {ln (1− Φ0[κ])− ln (1− Φ0[κ+ ∆])}
∂κ
> 0.
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Otherwise put,
∂
∫ κ+∆
κ
∂ ln(1−Φ0[t])
∂t dt
∂κ
=
∂
∫∆
0
∂ ln(1−Φ0[κ+u])
∂u du
∂κ
< 0. (A.15)
(A.15) necessarily holds if
∂ ∂ ln(1−Φ0[κ+u])∂u
∂κ
=
∂ −φ0[κ+u]1−Φ0[κ+u]
∂κ
< 0. (A.16)
(A.16) needs to be true for any κ, thus equivalently we can show that
∂ −φ0[κ]1−Φ0[κ]
∂κ
< 0. (A.17)
Since in
−φ0[κ]
1− Φ0[κ] = −
(∫ ∞
κ
φ0(t)
φ0(κ)
dt
)−1
= −
(∫ ∞
0
φ0(u+ κ)
φ0(κ)
du
)−1
= −
(∫ ∞
0
e−
u2
2σ2−
κu
σ2 du
)−1
,
for a fixed u > 0, each integrand is strictly decreasing in κ, the same holds for the negative
of the inverse of the integral.

Chapter 3
Exclusivity Clauses: Enhancing
Competition, Raising Prices
3.1 Introduction
If a firm accepts a contract with an exclusivity clause, it may not deal with
competitors of the firm that issued the contract. The debate on such exclusiv-
ity agreements divides policy makers and scholars into two fractions. Critics
argue that exclusivity clauses are anticompetitive because they foreclose en-
try.1 Advocates invoke efficiency motives, claiming that exclusivity protects
value-generating investments from free-riding.2
In this chapter, we compare arguments for and against exclusivity clauses. To do
so, it is crucial to specify which type of exclusivity we are looking at. According
1Proponents of the foreclosure argument include Aghion and Bolton (1987), Rasmusen,
Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991), and Segal and Whinston (2000b). Upon Fumagalli and Motta’s
(2006) critique that the former authors’ findings rely on buyers being final customers, Simpson
and Wickelgren (2007) and Wright (2009) extend the argument to a setting more similar to
ours, including buyers competing in a downstream market.
2Proponents of the incentives argument include Williamson (1979) and Marvel (1982).
Segal and Whinston (2000a) and Bernheim and Whinston (1998) specify that the efficiency-
enhancing property of exclusivity clauses only holds in cases where investment has external
effects on third parties.
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to Segal and Whinston (2000a), “a contract between a buyer and a seller is
said to be exclusive if it prohibits one party to the contract from dealing with
other agents.” In our model, the character of exclusivity depends on which side
of the market offers contracts. Most of the existing literature deals with what
is usually called “exclusive dealing”: Suppliers write contracts with exclusivity
clauses, which prohibit retailers to purchase from other suppliers. In addition
to this, we also discuss what we refer to as “exclusive provision”: Retailers offer
contracts with exclusivity clauses, which stipulate that contracting suppliers are
not allowed to additionally sell to other retailers.3
A prominent example for exclusive provision is the distribution of Apple’s
iPhone via selected service providers.4 For instance, in the United States, the
iPhone was sold exclusively through AT&T between 2007 and 2011.5 That is,
every customer who wanted to buy an iPhone had to accept AT&T’s monopoly
price. Obviously, this generates a correspondingly high willingness-to-pay for
exclusivity on behalf of AT&T. As financial data suggests, it was indeed Apple
who ended up reaping the bulk of the benefits from this exclusivity arrange-
ment.6
In the following, we show that this straightforward mechanism carries over to
more competitive settings. This is remarkable, as even with several retailers
reselling a homogeneous product obtained from multiple suppliers, the resulting
allocation might be the same as in the monopoly case.7
3In addition to exclusive provision and exclusive dealing, one could also look at mutual
exclusivity (as is the case of marriage arrangements). We refrain from discussing such agree-
ments in this chapter.
4The arrangements between Apple and the service providers are usually referred to as
“tying” agreements. In the present chapter, however, we ignore the complementary between
the primary good and potential services provided by retailers. In fact, we consider retailers
as pure reselling entities.
5Similar agreements were established in numerous other countries, such as Germany (T-
Mobile), UK (O2), Japan (SoftBank Mobile), and Spain (Movistar).
6See, for instance, Kuittinen (2012).
7For the sake of brevity, we do not show the equivalence between the monopolistic and
the competitive setting here. The results are available on request.
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Imagine a setting with two suppliers and two retailers. Exclusivity clauses re-
quire that the suppliers sell their product to only one retailer.8 In return, a
retailer could offer more favorable quantities and wholesale prices. Alterna-
tively, the retailer could offer less favorable terms, but allow the suppliers to
contract with its competitor as well. If both retailers choose this second option,
they effectively eliminate competition between them in the upstream market:
as long as the suppliers’ production cost is covered, both offers are accepted.
In this case, the retailers purchase Cournot quantities and both make positive
profits. However, if a retailer found a way to also eliminate competition in the
downstream market, its margin would be even higher. By means of the exclusiv-
ity clause, it is equipped with an instrument which facilitates this purpose. An
arbitrarily small compensation is sufficient to induce both suppliers to accept
such a clause. Hence, both of them provide the same retailer, which in turn
obtains a monopoly position in the downstream market.
Of course, one retailer obtaining the monopoly profit and the other getting
nothing cannot be an equilibrium. Facing exclusivity clauses, suppliers have
to select a single retailer. Hence they only head for the most favorable deal.
This in turn induces tough competition between the retailers. In fact, they are
forced to extract as much consumer surplus as possible and redirect it to the
suppliers. Thus exclusivity clauses strengthen competition, but competition for
the suppliers instead of competition for the customers.
Our efficiency argument is quite in contrast with a variety of papers that sup-
port the traditional Chicago School argument that exclusivity clauses mainly
arise to economize on transaction costs.9 In Marvel (1982), exclusive dealing
allows suppliers to prevent retailers from opportunistic behavior. Once the re-
tailers refrain from buying no-frills substitutes, suppliers are willing to invest
into value-generating pre-sale information. Thus exclusive dealing provides a
8Accordingly, we consider exclusive provision as defined above. We formally discuss this
case in Section 3.3. The conclusions drawn here are only partially applicable to exclusive
dealing, as we show in Section 3.4.
9Classical examples are Bork (1978) and Williamson (1979).
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supplier with a property right on promotional expenses. In a similar vein,
McAfee and Schwartz (1994) show that a (monopolistic) supplier is confronted
with its own incentive to renegotiate terms with competing retailers. Doing so
impairs the rewards for incumbent retailers and decreases their ex-ante willing-
ness to pay. Exclusivity clauses are an easily observable and verifiable approach
to curb such opportunism. As in Marvel (1982), they increase the joint profit
by inducing a higher level of investment. Accordingly, demand might increase
as well. This, in turn, leaves the potential for positive welfare implications.
In contrast, welfare is clearly negatively affected if exclusivity clauses are strate-
gically deployed to deter entry which otherwise would have taken place. In Ras-
musen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000b), suppliers
need to reach a certain scale to produce at minimum average cost. By locking
in sufficiently many buyers, an incumbent supplier can thus prevent entry of
competitors, and buyers agree to sign contracts including exclusivity clauses. In
an earlier article, Aghion and Bolton (1987) show that entry prevention is also
possible without a positive minimum efficient scale if the incumbent can draw
on more sophisticated contracts including “liquidated damages” clauses. Such
contingent transfers to the incumbent supplier serve as an entry fee for outside
suppliers, and enable the incumbent supplier–retailer pair to extract monopoly
rents.10
Our model builds upon a similar idea, although we drop the asymmetry between
incumbents and entrants and thus investigate a more competitive framework.
Consequently, contracting parties use exclusivity clauses not for strategic pur-
poses but because they are forced to use them to withstand competition. This
turns out to be self-destructive. Whenever a contract-issuing firm employs an
exclusivity clause, it has to promise the most favorable prices and quantities
10In line with the existing theory, the empirical literature on exclusivity clauses is incon-
clusive. Evidence on customer price effects is scarce and mainly centered around the beer
brewing industry. For an overview, see Lafontaine and Slade (2008). Furthermore, authors
such as Slade (2000) and Asker (2004) find that exclusivity constraints lead to higher markups
of the vertical supply chain and increased customer prices. These observations are consistent
with both lines of reasoning.
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to its counterparties. Thus it ends up with zero profit. Altogether, we obtain
the same quantities and prices as in a setting with a single vertically integrated
firm.11
We organize this chapter as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce the model.
Next we discuss how the outcome depends on the sequence of play. In Section
3.3 we study the case of exclusive provision. We distinguish between two sce-
narios: fist we study homogeneous suppliers; then we consider a situation in
which their costs of production differ. In the latter instance, screening becomes
possible, along with an outcome where only the efficient supplier prevails. In
Section 3.4 we contrast exclusive provision with exclusive dealing, the standard
setting in the literature. Exclusivity clauses now force suppliers to maximize the
retailers’ individual profits. This induces Cournot rather than monopoly quan-
tities, resulting in a lower customer price. While a ban on exclusive provision
may increase welfare, prohibiting exclusive dealing has adverse effects: Absent
exclusivity clauses, suppliers set their wholesale prices above marginal cost. In
turn they have to reduce their quantities, as otherwise the retailers buy from
one supplier only. This increases the customer price in the downstream market.
In Section 3.5, we take account of the conflicting implications of exclusive pro-
vision and exclusive dealing. Which type of contract arises endogenously? We
conjecture that retailers could confront exclusive-dealing contracts with more
profitable counteroffers. Exclusive-provision contracts are less vulnerable, thus
we expect the retailers to make offers in equilibrium. In Section 3.6, we con-
clude by discussing our results in light of their policy implications. All proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
11To be precise, this conclusion is restricted to the exclusive-provision framework. With ex-
clusive dealing, the maximization of individual retailers’ surpluses entails Cournot quantities
and prices.
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3.2 Model
We consider the following vertical relation. Suppliers produce a good, which
they sell to retailers. These, in turn, resell it to final customers. Demand is
given by p(Q) = a− bQ, where p is the output price and Q is the total quantity
sold in the downstream market. Demand is positive for a positive range of p,
and the law of demand applies; that is, a > 0 and b > 0.
In the upstream market there are two groups of strategic players: two suppliers
and two retailers.12 Each supplier s ∈ {H,L} maximizes the expected value of
pis =
∑
r∈{1,2}
(wsr − cs)qsr, (1)
where qsr is the quantity of the output that supplier s sells to retailer r ∈ {1, 2},
and wsr is the (per-unit) wholesale price. cs is the marginal cost of production
of supplier s.13 We assume supplier H to be (weakly) less efficient than supplier
L. Specifically, cH = c+ ∆, and cL = c−∆ with ∆ ≥ 0. Suppliers cannot sell
their output directly to customers. Instead, supplier s sells it at a wholesale
price wsr to retailer r.
The retailers buy the input in the upstream market and sell it to final customers.
Each retailer r ∈ {1, 2} maximizes the expected value of
pir =
∑
s∈{H,L}
(p(Q)− wsr)qsr, (2)
with Q = ∑s∈{H,L}∑r∈{1,2} qsr. r resells the product to final customers. For
simplicity, we assume that this can be done without incurring any additional
(reselling) cost.
12Most of the results which follow are readily applicable to settings with more firms, because
Bertrand-related mechanisms lead to perfect competition already with two firms.
13From p(Q) = a − bQ, we see that cs ≥ a implies that there are no gains from trade.
Therefore, without any loss of generality, we impose that cs < a for s ∈ {1, 2}.
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The determination of wsr and qsr crucially depends on the sequence of moves.
In Section 3.3, we consider the case where the retailers fix wholesale prices and
quantities which they are willing to buy. In Section 3.4, the suppliers announce
terms of sale. We specify the contracts below, along with the exclusivity clauses
which the firms may impose. For now, a general description of the contracting
game suffices: In a first stage, either the retailers (Section 3.3) or the suppliers
(Section 3.4) make binding take-it-or-leave-it offers. In the second stage, the
recipients of these offers may accept one, both, or none of these offers. Their
choice might be restricted, as they potentially have to abide by exclusivity
clauses.
We focus on symmetric, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies,
according to the following assumptions.
Assumption 2 (Symmetry). Identical players choose identical strategies. As the
suppliers differ in their production efficiency, Assumption 2 only applies to the
retailers.
Assumption 3 (Pure Strategies). We analyze Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
If a retailer faces two identical offers from suppliers H and L, the offer from
(the more efficient) supplier L is chosen. If a supplier faces two identical offers
from (identical) retailers, each of these offers is selected with probability 0.5.
Assumption 4 (Subgame Perfection). The contract-submitting parties do not
make offers which generate negative payoffs if accepted. Accordingly, we rule
out equilibria in weakly dominated strategies.
3.3 Exclusive Provision
In this section, we consider the case where the retailers r ∈ {1, 2} make binding
offers, and the suppliers s ∈ {H,L} select among these. Offers from the retailers
are of the type Φr := (qr, wr, er), where qr = qsr for s = {H,L}, and wr = wsr
for s = {H,L}. Furthermore, er is a binary choice variable, which indicates
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Figure 3.1: Exclusive Provision
whether retailer r stipulates an exclusivity clause. If er = 1, each supplier
which sells to r is not allowed to sell the product to the other retailer. If er = 0
for r = {1, 2}, the suppliers are allowed to accept both offers.14
In Figure 3.1, we illustrate exclusive provision. In the upper-left diagram, we
depict a situation without exclusivity clauses. Thus both suppliers, s1 and s2,
can provide both retailers, r1 and r2. In the upper-right diagram, a supplier
selling its product to r2 is not allowed to additionally provide r1. Meanwhile,
there is no contractual restriction which prevents r1’s suppliers to also provide
r2. Nevertheless, s1 cannot serve both retailers either. If s1 approaches r2, it
forgoes the possibility to provide r1. We depict this in the lower-left panel.
In fact, the suppliers’ options are equally restricted, regardless of whether one
or both retailers impose exclusivity clauses. Accordingly, in both instances we
obtain the same set of possible outcomes (compare the upper-right panel with
the lower-right panel).
14Note that, say, e1 = 1 and e2 = 0 implies that the suppliers cannot deal with both
retailers. Thus a retailer can single-handedly install overall exclusivity, and no retailer can
unilaterally remove an overall exclusivity regime if er = 1 for r = {1, 2}.
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In order to derive equilibria Φ∗r (and eliminate putative equilibria Φˆr), we study
properties of qr, wr, and er which necessarily hold whenever no retailer has
a unilateral incentive to offer an alternative bundle Φ˜r.15 At the end of this
section, we show that equilibria Φ∗r necessarily feature exclusivity clauses. For
the moment, to facilitate the analysis, we simply assume that e∗r = 1 for r =
{1, 2}.
From (2), we can write the expected profit of retailer r as16
E[pir] =
∑
x∈{1,2}
P [r has x suppliers](p(Q)− wr)xqr. (3)
From (1), it further follows that supplier s’s profit upon accepting r’s offer is
pis(r) = (wr − cs)qr. (4)
Provided that both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied (pis(r) is
non-negative for either r), we infer from (4) that supplier s ∈ {H,L} approaches
retailer r whenever qr(wr − cs) > q−r(w−r − cs). If qr(wr − cs) = q−r(w−r − cs),
each supplier is indifferent between the two retailers, and Assumption 3 implies
that the suppliers accept the offer of each retailer with probability 1/2. In this
case, r obtains 2qr with probability 1/4, qr with probability 1/2, and 0 with
probability 1/4. Accordingly, (3) equals
pir =

(a− 2bqr − §r)2qr if (wr − cs)qr > (w−r − cs)q−r,
(a− bqr − bq−r − wr)qr if (wr − cs)qr = (w−r − cs)q−r,
0 if (wr − cs)qr < (w−r − cs)q−r.
(5)
15In this section, we interchangeably use Φ∗r to denote equilibria and equilibrium contracts
(analogous with putative equilibria Φˆr). Implicitly, equilibria further require that each sup-
plier accepts the most profitable contract. (Regarding ties, see Assumption 3.)
16For ease of notation, we omit the expectation operator in the following.
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By means of the following lemmas, we show that for cH = cL the retailers
strongly compete for the two suppliers. For sufficiently high levels of ∆, they
only compete for the efficient supplier L, and the less efficient supplier H is
driven out of the market.
Note that Lemmas 1 trough 4 throughout make reference to equilibria where
the retailers make offers. Furthermore, we consistently suppress the implicit
assumption that e∗r = 1 for r ∈ {1, 2}.
Lemma 1. Both retailers obtain zero profit. Thus, if both suppliers’ participa-
tion constraints are satisfied, we have
w∗r = a− b2q∗r . (6)
If only the efficient supplier’s participation constraint is satisfied, we have
w∗r = a− bq∗r . (7)
Lemma 1 implies zero profits on behalf of the retailers, which is a necessary
condition for each individual retailer to not having an incentive to outbid its
opponent’s offer (and thereby double its own customer base).
Lemma 2. If both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied, the profit of
either supplier H or supplier L is maximized subject to (6). If only the efficient
supplier L’s participation constraint is satisfied, L’s profit is maximized subject
to equation (7).
For some intuition for Lemma 2, consider Figure 3.2, where wr = a − 2bqr
depicts the zero-profit line of the retailers for the case where both suppliers
accept an offer. From equation (4), we can state supplier s’s marginal rate of
substitution between qr and wr at (qˆr, wˆr) as17
17As can be seen in Figure 3.2 (and will be of importance later on), the absolute value of
MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) exceeds the absolute value of MRSH(qˆr, wˆr). This is because the lower marginal
cost of supplier L leads to higher markups for L than for H (wˆr−cL > wˆr−cH). Accordingly,
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wr = a− 2bqr
piL(qˆr, wˆr)
piH(qˆr, wˆr)
(q˜r, w˜r) (qˆr, wˆr)
Figure 3.2: If no suppliers’ profit is maximized conditional on wr = a− 2bqr, a
deviating retailer can attract both suppliers and obtain a positive profit.
MRSs(qˆr, wˆr) := −wˆr − cs
qˆr
> −2b,
In the example of Figure 3.2, in contrast to Lemma 2, neither supplier L’s
nor supplier H’s profit is maximized conditional on the retailers’ zero-profit
condition. Specifically, we have MRSs(qˆr, wˆr) > −2b for s ∈ {H,L}. Due to
the intersection of the suppliers’ isoprofit curves with the retailers’ zero-profit
line, a deviating retailer r could instead offer (q˜r, w˜r) within the shaded region
in Figure 3.2. Since for both suppliers such an offer would lead to higher profits
than (qˆr, wˆr), the deviating retailer r would attract both H and L. Hence, r’s
zero-profit line would be unaffected, which implies that (q˜r, w˜r) would lead to
positive profits. In this case, as well as in all other cases where not at least
either H’s or L’s profit is maximized conditional on the retailers’ zero-profit
condition, (qˆr, wˆr) cannot be part of an equilibrium.
It directly follows from Lemma 2 that in the case of homogenous suppliers, both
retailers offer (half of) the monopoly quantity.
Corollary 1. For ∆ = 0, we have q∗r = (a− c)/4b and w∗r = (a+ c)/2.
to sustain the profit at a constant level, a reduction in qr requires a higher compensation for
L than for H.
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piH(qˆr, wˆr)
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Figure 3.3: If supplier H’s profit is maximized conditional on wr = a− 2bqr, a
deviating retailer can attract supplier L and obtain a positive profit.
Simple as it is, Corollary 1 conveys a central result of this chapter: The retailers’
exclusivity clauses imply that only the best offer has a chance of being accepted.
Hence competition is vigorous. Not only do the retailers offer wholesale prices
which equal the price they charge their final customers. In addition, total
quantities aggregate to the amount a monopolistic vertically integrated firm
would sell. Once all retailers offer their share of the monopoly quantity, the final
price is independent of the suppliers’ allocation. Thus if an individual retailer
lowers its quantity, it would be disregarded by the suppliers. By offering more,
it would make losses.
In a similar way as in Lemma 2, next we rule out equilibria where the profit of
supplier H is maximized.
Lemma 3. For ∆ > 0, an outcome where the profit of supplier H is maximized
subject to (6) cannot be an equilibrium.
In a putative equilibrium Φˆr where the profit of the less efficient supplier H is
maximized (conditional on wr = a− 2bqr), the (absolute value of the) marginal
rate of substitution of supplier L exceeds the slope of the zero-profit line of the
retailers (see Figure 3.3). Due to the intersection of L’s isoprofit curve with the
retailers’ zero-profit line, a deviating retailer r could instead offer Φ˜r, which lies
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in the region of positive profits for the retailers, even with the original zero-
profit line. Furthermore, by offering Φ˜r, supplier r’s zero-profit line becomes
wr = a − bqˆr − bqr. That is, it rotates around (qˆr, wˆr), as indicated by the
dashed line in Figure 3.3. If retailer r offered any contract within the shaded
area in Figure 3.3, the inefficient supplier H would strictly prefer the opponent
retailer −r (which offers Φˆ), and the efficient supplier L would strictly prefer
r. Hence, by exclusively attracting supplier L, r could increase its profit, which
eliminates Φˆr.
From Lemmas 1 through 3, it follows that in any symmetric equilibrium, the
profit of supplier L must be maximized subject to (6) or (7), that is, to a zero-
profit condition of the retailers. As we show next, whenever this implies that
both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied, there are profitable devi-
ations possible (unless if ∆ = 0, see Corollary 1), and there is no equilibrium.
However, if cL and cH are sufficiently far apart from each other, there exists
a unique equilibrium where only the efficient supplier L is attracted by the
retailers.
Lemma 4. For ∆ > 0, there exists no equilibrium where both suppliers’ par-
ticipation constraints are satisfied. If ∆ > (a − c)/3, there exists a unique
equilibrium in which H’s participation constraint is violated.
To see this, first consider a candidate equilibrium where both suppliers partic-
ipate. From Lemmas 2 and 3, we know that MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) = −2b in such an
equilibrium. Since MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) < MRSH(qˆr, wˆr), it is generally possible to
increase qr and decrease wr in a way that the new contract Φ˜r is only attractive
for supplier L. As a consequence, the zero-profit line rotates around (qˆr, wˆr)
(see Figure 3.3) such that Φ˜r, which leads to negative profits according to the
original zero-profit line, becomes profitable.18
Deviations of this type, however, are not feasible if an equilibrium contract
Φ∗r violates supplier H’s participation constraint. In this case, it follows from
18Instead of attracting each supplier with probability 1/2, the deviating retailer attracts
supplier L for sure.
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qr
wr
wr = a− bqr
cH
wr = a− bq∗r − bqr
(q∗r , w∗r)
piL(q∗r , w∗r)
p∗ = a− bq∗r
Figure 3.4: If supplier L’s profit is maximized conditional on wr = a− bqr, and
cH is sufficiently high, no contract for which wH ≥ cH is profitable.
Lemmas 1 and 2 that any profitable deviation involves attracting the inefficient
supplier H. Since the region of profitable contracts with two suppliers, wr <
a − b2qr, is a subset of the region of profitable contracts with one supplier,
wr < a − bqr, there is no profitable deviation which involves attracting both
suppliers. Hence, the only possible deviation would be attracting supplier H
without attracting supplier L. However, since L would stay with the other
retailer, any quantity provided by supplier H would further deteriorate the
customer price p. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, it follows from the retailers’
zero-profit condition (w∗r = p∗) and H’s non-participation condition (w∗r < cH)
that p∗ < cH . Hence, no contract Φ˜r with q˜r > 0 and w˜r ≥ cH would lead
to positive profits of the retailer, indicated by the shaded area in Figure 3.4.
Therefore, whenever maximizing supplier L’s profit conditional on the retailers’
zero-profit condition (7) leads to a wholesale price below cH , there exists an
equilibrium where the less efficient supplier H does not accept any offer. This
is the case if and only if
w∗r =
a+ cL
2 < cH ⇔ ∆ >
a− c
3 .
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What Happens if Exclusivity Clauses are Banned? Suppose now that
exclusivity clauses are illegal. In this case, supplier s ∈ {H,L} accepts any
offer with wr ≥ cs. Accordingly, each retailer sets wNEr = cL. Furthermore,
from quantity competition in the downstream market, both retailers purchase
the Cournot quantity qNEr = (a− cL)/3b, and obatain piNEr = (a− cL)2/9b.
Will Exclusivity Clauses Be Used? When exclusivity clauses are allowed,
will they actually be used?
From the previous paragraph, we know that in a candidate equilibrium without
exclusivity clauses, both suppliers obtain zero profit, that is, piNEs = 0 for s ∈
{H,L}.
If ∆ > 0, by offering Φ˜r with w˜r = cL + ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small, even
in combination with an exclusivity clause, r could attract L without attracting
H. As a monopolist in the downstream market, r could set q˜r = (a − w˜r)/2b.
Since p˜ir = (a− w˜r)2/4b exceeds piNEr for ε < (a− c+ ∆)/3, this eliminates the
candidate equilibrium without exclusivity clauses.
If ∆ = 0, r would attract both suppliers by offering w˜r = c + ε, and could
therefore set q˜r = (a − c)/4b. For ε < (a − c)/3, this constitutes a profitable
deviation.
Regarding equilibria with exclusivity clauses, a unilateral deviation from e∗r = 1
to e˜r = 0 is effectless. As the other retailer maintains e∗−r = 1, the suppliers still
have to choose between the two retailers. Hence, the above results, together
with e∗r = 1 constitute an equilibrium indeed.
Proposition 1 summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 1. Consider the case where retailers can engage in exclusive pro-
vision. For ∆ = 0, there is a unique equilibrium, where each retailer offers Φ∗r
with q∗r = (a − c)/4b, w∗r = (a + c)/2, and e∗r = 1. Both suppliers choose each
retailer with probability 1/2. The corresponding output price is p∗ = (a + c)/2.
Both retailers make zero profit. The profit of each supplier s ∈ {H,L} is
pi∗s = (a − c)2/8b. For 0 < ∆ < (a − c)/3, there is no equilibrium. For
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∆ ≥ (a − c)/3, there is a unique equilibrium, where each retailer offers Φ∗r
with q∗r = (a− c+ ∆)/4b, w∗r = (a+ c−∆)/2, and e∗r = 1. Supplier L chooses
each retailer with probability 1/2. Supplier H does not accept any offer. The
output price is p∗ = (a + c − ∆)/2. Both retailers and supplier H make zero
profit. Supplier L obtains pi∗L = (a− c+ ∆)2/4b.
3.4 Exclusive Dealing
Now we look at the opposite setting where the suppliers s ∈ {H,L} make
binding offers, and the retailers select among these. Offers from the suppliers
are of the type Φs := (qs, ws, es), where qs = qsr for r = {1, 2}, and ws = wsr
for r = {1, 2}.19 Analogous to the case above, es indicates whether s stipulates
an exclusivity clause. If es = 1, each retailer which purchases qs at ws from s
is not allowed to purchase the product from the other supplier. If es = 0 for
s = {H,L}, the retailers are allowed to purchase from both suppliers.
In Figure 3.1, we illustrate exclusive dealing. When either none or both suppli-
ers impose exclusivity clauses, the firms’ possibilities to cooperate are equally
restricted as with exclusive provision. Thus we refrain from replicating the re-
spective diagrams from Figure 3.1. If only one supplier requires exclusivity, the
choice of the retailers is restricted. Each of them can only purchase from one
supplier. In the left panel, we depict a situation where retailer r2, which pur-
chases from supplier s2, is contractually restricted to not purchase from supplier
s1. Retailer r1 is not restricted by its own supplier, s1. However, r1’s choice
is equally limited, since s2 refuses to deal with r1 as long as r1 maintains its
relation with s1. Otherwise put, in order to purchase from s2, r1 has to forego
its relation with s1 (see the right panel).
In any equilibrium (Φ∗s,Φ∗−s) where both retailers accept the offer of supplier s,
accepting this offer must be a weakly dominant strategy. To avoid repetitions,
19By analogy with our previous notation (see footnote 15), we use (Φ∗H ,Φ∗L) to denote both
equilibria and equilibrium contracts. The same applies to putative equilibria (ΦˆH , ΦˆL).
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Figure 3.1: Exclusive Dealing
we occasionally refer to Result 1, which states that dominance can be broken
down to a single condition.
Result 1. Choosing supplier s is a (weakly) dominant strategy (over choosing
supplier −s) if and only if
(a− 2bqs − ws)qs > (≥) (a− bqs − bq−s − w−s)q−s. (8)
Accordingly, whenever s caters both retailers, each retailer would also accept
s’s offer if the other retailer would not. Therefore, in the subgames where
the retailers choose their suppliers, every equilibrium where s prevails is an
equilibrium in dominant strategies.
As in the previous section, we derive (Φ∗H ,Φ∗L) by means of a number of lem-
mas. In Lemmas 5 through 8, we suppress that we refer to equilibria where the
suppliers make offers. At the end of this section, we show that in most circum-
stances equilibria necessarily feature exclusivity clauses, and in the remaining
cases where equilibria without exclusivity clauses exist, this is because there is
a de-facto monopoly on behalf of the more efficient supplier L. For the moment,
we simply assume that e∗s = 1 for s ∈ {H,L}.
Lemma 5. The less efficient supplier H is not chosen by any retailer.
The intuition for Lemma 5 is simple: If supplier H’s contract was to be ac-
cepted, it must be strictly better than L’s offer. Thus L could undercut H by
mimicking H and marginally lower the offered wholesale price. This is possible
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unless wˆH = cH and cH = cL. Nevertheless, also this remaining case cannot be
an equilibrium. Since H’s offer would be strictly better that L’s offer, H could
marginally decrease its offered wholesale price. Its offer would still be strictly
better, and H could obtain a positive profit. This eliminates all putative equi-
libria of this type.
Lemma 6. Supplier H sets w∗H ≥ cH , supplier L sets w∗L ≤ cH .
The first statement of Lemma 6 directly follows from Assumption 4: Each
putative equilibrium where supplier H sets its wholesale price below marginal
cost violates subgame perfection. The second statement stems from the fact
that H could obtain a positive profit by slightly undercutting L’s offer whenever
wˆL > cH . This is in contradiction with Lemma 5.
Lemma 7. If ∆ ≥ 3(a − c)/5, there exists a continuum of equilibria with
q∗L = (a− cL)/4b and w∗L = (a+ cL)/2. If 0 ≤ ∆ < 3(a− c)/5, every equilibrium
features w∗L = w∗H = cH .
From Result 1 we know that a necessary condition for supplier H to profitably
enter is to attract one retailer, given the other retailer sticks with L. Although
the retailers make zero profit at L, to offer a mutually profitable contract Φ˜H ,
the inefficient supplier H must ensure that the resulting total quantity q˜H + q∗L
is low enough to cause the customer price taking on a value above w˜H . Since the
low marginal cost cL of supplier L further implies a high (monopoly) quantity
q∗L, there is no low enough q˜H > 0 which attracts a retailer, given w˜H > cH .20
If ∆ is small, supplier L cannot maintain its monopoly contract. In this case,
if we had wˆL < wˆH , and the retailers strictly preferred L’s offer, L could do
better by slightly increasing wL such that choosing L would still be a dominant
strategy for the retailers. Similarly, if the retailers are indifferent between the
20If H offered a sufficiently small q˜H in combination with cH < w˜H < a, both retailers (and
thus the deviating supplier H) would profit by mutually accepting H’s offer. However, the
retailers suffer from a “prisoners’ dilemma”.
3.4. EXCLUSIVE DEALING 93
two suppliers’ offers (and accept L’s offer, see Assumption 3), we show in Ap-
pendix 3.A.9 that L’s best reaction to any of H’s offers ΦH involves w∗L ≥ wH .
Together with Lemma 6, this implies w∗H = w∗L = cH .
Lemma 8. If 0 ≤ ∆ < 3(a− c)/5, in any equilibrium each supplier s ∈ {H,L}
offers Φ∗s with q∗s = (a−c−s)/3b. Together with Lemma 7, this implies that there
is no equilibrium whenever 0 < ∆ < 3(a− c)/5. If ∆ = 0, there exists a unique
equilibrium.
Lemma 8 states that, if ∆ = 0, both suppliers offer the Cournot duopoly quan-
tity at a wholesale price equal to the suppliers’ marginal cost. Accordingly,
both retailers are provided with the quantity which they would have chosen
themselves. If, say, supplier −s would offer a different quantity, the contract of
supplier s which includes the Cournot quantity would be strictly better. This
would give s an incentive to increase its wholesale price ws.
If ∆ > 0, Lemma 8 requires that each supplier offers the Cournot quantity with
marginal costs of the other supplier. If this could be done by simultaneously
offering a wholesale price which equals the other supplier’s marginal cost, there
would not be a way to profitably deviate. This, however, is not possible for the
inefficient supplier H which would incur losses by doing so. That is, L is more
competitive, and it follows from standard results of Cournot theory that L’s
quantity lies above H’s quantity. In this case, L wants to decrease its wholesale
price, which is in contrast to the result of Lemma 7. Accordingly, there is no
equilibrium for 0 < ∆ < 3(a− c)/5.
Before we summarize the results of Lemmas 5 through 8 in Proposition 2, we
discuss the possibility of equilibria without exclusivity clauses.
What Happens if Exclusivity Clauses are Banned? As in the previous
section, we compare the above equilibria with results which emerge under a ban
on exclusivity clauses.
In a “no-exclusivity” equilibrium ΦNEs with es = 0 for s = {H,L}, first suppose
that both suppliers offer positive quantities which are accepted by the retailers.
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If this is true, retailer r has no incentive to deviate by not purchasing from
supplier s. That is,
(a− 2bqs − 2bq−s − ws)qs
+ (a− 2bqs − 2bq−s − w−s)q−s
≥ (a− bqs − 2bq−s − w−s)q−s. (9)
Furthermore, (9) has to hold as an equality, as otherwise supplier s could in-
crease its wholesale price ws without deterring any retailer. Upon simplifica-
tion, this implies ws = a − b(2qs + 3q−s), and in an equilibrium each supplier
s ∈ {H,L} solves
(qNEs , wNEs ) = arg maxqs,ws (ws − cs)2qs
s.t. ws = a− b(2qs + 3q−s), (10)
which yields the reaction function of supplier s,
qNEs (qNE−s ) =
a− cs
4b −
3
4q
NE
−s . (11)
Together with the constraint in (10), equation (11) implies
qNEs = (a+ 3c−s − 4cs)/7b, (12)
wNEs = (2a+ 6c−s − cs)/7, (13)
and
piNEs = (2a+ 6c−s − 8cs)2/49b.
If ∆ > (a− c)/7, we have qNEH = 0, and L acts as a monopolist in the upstream
market. Therefore, L sells qNEL = (a − c + ∆)/4b at wNEL = (a + c − ∆)/2.
In this case, H cannot make an offer which the retailers accept in addition to
L’s offer. H can, however, attempt to make an offer which the retailers choose
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instead of L’s offer. Since each retailer r obtains piNEr = 0 at L, H could attract
r and obtain a positive profit by offering Φ˜H with w˜H = cH + ε, ε > 0, and
(a− bqNEL − bq˜H − w˜H)q˜H > 0. As it is possible to find such an offer whenever
0 < ∆ < 3(a− c)/5, there is no equilibrium within this range.
If ∆ ≥ 3(a − c)/5, the inefficient supplier H has no means to challenge L’s
monopoly behavior. Accordingly, the outcome under a ban on exclusivity
clauses mirrors the outcome when exclusivity clauses are allowed (see Lemma
7). In fact, due to the absence of H’s competitiveness, the market structure is
the same as with only one supplier. Of course, under such circumstances it is
irrelevant to distinguish between varying exclusivity regimes.
Will Exclusivity Clauses Be Used? First consider the case where, under
a ban of exclusivity clauses, both suppliers sell positive quantities; that is,
∆ ≤ (a − c)/7. In this case, once exclusivity clauses are allowed, (ΦNEH ,ΦNEL )
with eNEs = 0 for s = {H,L} no longer constitutes an equilibrium. More
precisely, supplier H could profitably deviate by offering an alternative contract
Φ˜H with q˜H = 2(a − c)/7b, w˜H = (2a + 5c)/7 − ε, and e˜H = 1. That is, in
addition to imposing an exclusivity clause, H could offer the total quantity of
both suppliers, given in (12), at a wholesale price which is slightly below the
average wholesale price, given in (13). To see this, first note from Result 1, it
is a dominant strategy for retailer r to choose H’s offer whenever
(a− 2bq˜H − w˜H)q˜H > (a− bq˜H − bqNEL − wNEL )qNEL
⇔ ε[(a− c)/7] > −∆2.
which holds for all ∆ ≥ 0 and ε > 0. Consequently, H’s deviation profit
would exceed H’s equilibrium profit in the case of a ban on exclusivity clauses
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whenever
(w˜H − cH)2q˜H > piNEH = 4(a− c− 7∆)/49b
⇔ ε[28(a− c)2] < (a− c)2 − 49∆2 + 7(a− c)∆. (14)
Since for ∆ < (a − c)/7 it holds that 49∆2 < (a − c)2, the right-hand side of
(14) is positive for all ∆ ∈ [0, (a − c)/7]. Hence, there exists ε > 0 such that
both retailers would prefer H’s alternative contract Φ˜H , and H would increase
its profit.
Next, consider the case where only L sells a positive quantity in the absence
of exclusivity clauses. As we have shown in the previous paragraph, in this
case it is not possible for supplier H to persuade a retailer to choose H instead
of L, neither with nor without exclusivity clauses. Furthermore, L obtains its
unconstrained profit maximum. Therefore, if ∆ ≥ 3(a− c)/5, equilibria require
no restrictions on exclusivity clauses of either supplier.
Finally, regarding equilibria with exclusivity clauses, unilateral deviations from
e∗s = 1 to e˜s = 0 are effectless, and the offers Φ∗s of Lemma 8, together with
e∗s = 1 for s = {H,L} constitute an equilibrium indeed. However, there are two
additional equilibria where only one supplier imposes an exclusivity clause. If
∆ = 0, and the opponent supplier sets e∗−s = 0, supplier s which sets e∗s = 1
could remove bilateral exclusivity by individually switching to e˜s = 0. Nev-
ertheless, in this case, inequality (9), together with q∗−s = (a − c)/3b, requires
w˜s ≤ c− 2bq˜s, which prevents s from obtaining a positive profit.
We summarize the results of this section in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Consider the case where suppliers can engage in exclusive deal-
ing. For ∆ = 0, each supplier s ∈ {H,L} offers Φ∗s with q∗s = (a − c)/3b,
w∗s = c, and e∗r ∈ {0, 1}. At least one supplier sets e∗r = 1. Both retailers
accept the offer of supplier L. The output price is p∗ = (a + 2c)/3. Both sup-
pliers make zero profit. The profit of each retailer is pi∗r = (a − c)2/9b. For
0 < ∆ < 3(a−c)/5, there is no equilibrium. For ∆ ≥ 3(a−c)/5, there is a con-
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tinuum of equilibria where supplier L offers Φ∗L = ΦNEL with q∗L = (a−c+∆)/4b,
w∗L = (a + c −∆)/2, and e∗L ∈ {0, 1}. Supplier H’s offer is such that both re-
tailers accept Φ∗L. Both retailers and supplier H make zero profit. The profit of
supplier L is pi∗L = (a− c+ ∆)2/4b.
3.5 Discussion
In order to discuss welfare properties of both unconstrained outcomes and equi-
libria in the case of a ban on exclusivity clauses, it is convenient to compare the
customer prices arising from final demand. Since the retailers’ and suppliers’
participation constraints ensure that no inefficiently high quantity is provided,
equilibrium customer prices can be used to compare utilitarian welfare levels.
In Table 3.1, we provide an overview of the customer prices as they depend on
the suppliers’ difference in efficiency, on the policy towards exclusivity clauses,
and on whether the retailers or the suppliers offer contracts.
If the retailers make offers, customer prices are higher once exclusivity clauses
are allowed. This holds because, without exclusivity clauses, the retailers do not
have to compete for suppliers, as the latter accept any offer which covers their
production cost. Accordingly, the retailers’ appetite for higher quantities is
only restrained by the negatively-sloped downstream demand curve. This leads
them to engage in Cournot competition, which implies p∗ = (a + 2(c −∆))/3.
In contrast, in the presence of exclusive provision, suppliers only accept the
most favorable contract, which induces the retailers to strongly compete. As a
result, the retailers are obliged to promise up to the maximum they can reap
in the downstream market. Consequently, they have to offer the monopoly
surplus, which they obtain from the customers thereupon. Even if the retailers
only compete for the efficient supplier L, the resulting customer price, p∗ =
(a + c − ∆)/2, still exceeds the customer price without exclusivity clauses,
pNE = (a+ 2(c−∆))/3.
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∆ ∈ 0
(
0, a−c7
] (
a−c
7 ,
a−c
3
) [
a−c
3 ,
3(a−c)
5
) [
3(a−c)
5 , a− c
)
Exclusive Provision
Exclusivity
allowed
a+c
2 — —
a+c−∆
2
a+c−∆
2
Exclusivity
banned
a+2c
3
a+2(c−∆)
3
a+2(c−∆)
3
a+2(c−∆)
3
a+2(c−∆)
3
Exclusive Dealing
Exclusivity
allowed
a+2c
3 — — —
a+c−∆
2
Exclusivity
banned
3a+4c
7
3a+4c
7 — —
a+c−∆
2
Table 3.1: Values of the customer price for various regimes and values of ∆.
This result is reversed once we examine the opposite setting where the suppliers
make offers. In this case, customer prices are lower with exclusivity clauses than
without. Similarly as described above, exclusivity clauses force the suppliers to
intensely compete for the retailers. Thus they have to offer the best possible
contract from an individual retailer’s perspective; that is, they sell Cournot
quantities at wholesale prices which equal their marginal cost of production. A
ban on exclusivity clauses, in principle, alleviates competition, as in this case
suppliers do not have to outperform their competitors in order to be taken
into consideration. However, when faced with large quantities, retailers may
profit from denying a contract, as this increases the customer price they obtain
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in the downstream market. Therefore, from equation (9), each supplier s is
constrained by
ws = a− b(2qs + 3q−s). (15)
By solely considering (15) (and supposing that ws = cs), we would find that a
ban on exclusive dealing increases the altogether provided quantity. However,
if wholesale prices were set at marginal cost, the suppliers would obtain zero
profit. This can be avoided by increasing ws, conditional on ensuring that (15)
still holds. Thus qs has to be reduced, which leads to a higher customer price
than in the case with exclusivity clauses.21
When allowed, irrespective of which side of the market makes offers, exclusivity
clauses are used (as long as there is no de-facto monopoly of a substantially
more efficient supplier L). Taking this into account, Table 3.1 shows that offers
of the retailers lead to higher customer prices than offers of the suppliers. In
both instances the firms necessarily maximize the profit of the other side of the
market. If the suppliers propose contracts, however, maximizing an individual
retailer’s surplus implies offering a higher quantity, since part of the negative
customer-price effect is passed on to the competing retailer. Such externalities
are absent if the retailers make offers.22 Therefore, retailers are better capable
of maximizing the joint surplus of the vertical supply chain, which leads to
higher customer prices.
Which Side of the Market Makes Offers? The question which conse-
quently arises is whether we rather expect exclusive provision (Section 3.3) or
exclusive dealing (Section 3.4) to prevail. Instead of building up a theoreti-
21If ∆ ≥ 3(a− c)/5, there is no difference between contracts with and without exclusivity
clauses. As discussed in Section 3.4, such a setting corresponds to a quasi-monopoly of the
more efficient supplier, where exclusivity regimes do not matter anymore.
22Externalities are also absent in case of exclusive dealing with a monopolistic retailer, as in
Bernheim and Whinston (1998). They find that “the form of representation (i.e., exclusivity
or common representation) is chosen to maximize the joint surplus of the [vertical supply
chain]”. This result does not apply here, as the suppliers are forced to use exclusivity clauses,
although the thus generated externalities result in a jointly less profitable allocation.
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cal superstructure, we refer to the Coase’s (1960) theorem, which essentially
postulates that voluntary contracts between firms necessarily maximize these
firms’ joint benefit. Accordingly, contracts will be specified in such a way that
there is no alternative contract with a higher joint surplus. As profit increases
can be split between the contracting parties, profit-maximizing contracts will
be agreed upon. Therefore, by reasoning along the lines of the previous sec-
tions, exclusive dealing cannot be sustained once we allow for counteroffers on
behalf of the retailers. The latter are more capable to extract the customers’
willingness to pay. Therefore, in principle, equilibria where the suppliers make
offers (as in Section 3.4) can be eliminated. Retailers find a counteroffers which
lead to a Pareto-superior allocations. Whether the above discussed instruments
(quantites, wholesale prices, exclusivity clauses) are sufficient to reach the equi-
librium of Section 3.3, or whether side-payments are required, clearly depends
on the structure of the “counteroffer game”. For the present chapter, we leave
this issue aside.
3.6 Conclusion
In contrast to previous work, in our setup exclusivity clauses are neither used
to foreclose, nor do they align incentives. Instead they are necessary features
of competitive contracts. Nevertheless, their welfare effect may be detrimental,
because competitive forces are not directed towards the well-being of customers.
Rather, to stay in business, contract-issuing firms have to maximize the profit
of their counterparts in the upstream market.
Of course, our results hinge on the specification of the framework. In particular,
firms are able to commit on an array of variables such as prices, quantities, and
exclusivity clauses. Hence possible extensions of the model would allow firms
to offer “menu contracts” or include bargaining on the terms of trade.
Regarding policy implications, our analysis suggests that prohibiting exclusivity
clauses potentially improves welfare. An overall ban, however, seems to be pre-
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mature. Despite our conjecture that “exclusive provision” arises endogenously,
in practice we often observe “exclusive dealing”. For this case, we have shown
that a prohibition of exclusivity clauses might reduce efficiency. Moreover, firms
could be induced to substitute exclusivity clauses by other vertical restraints
such as retail price maintenance, quantity discounts, exclusive territories, tying
and the like.
Against this ambiguous background, it seems consistent that both the United
States23 and the European Union24 treat exclusive contracts under a rule-of-
reason approach, in which economic efficiencies are balanced against anticom-
petitive effects. Nevertheless, as exemplified, policy makers should not be mis-
lead by the competition-promoting effect of exclusivity clauses: In fact, it is
precisely this effect which may force contract-issuing firms to exploit their final
customers.
23See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
24See European Commission (2010).
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3.A Appendices to Chapter 3
3.A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the case where both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied. Then, with
w∗r = a− b2q∗r , it follows from equation (5) that both retailers obtain zero profit.
To the contrary, suppose there is an equilibrium Φˆr with wˆr > a − b2qˆr. In this case, both
retailers make losses. By offering Φ˜r with q˜r(w˜r−cs) < qˆr(wˆr−cs) for s ∈ {H,L}, a deviating
retailer r would not be chosen by any supplier, which improves r’s profit to 0.
Suppose next that wˆr < a− b2qˆr. In this case,
pˆir = (a− 2bqˆr − wˆr)qˆr > 0. (A.1)
Due to the continuity of (A.1), for all ε > 0 there exist an alternative contract Φ˜r with q˜r > qˆr
and w˜r > wˆr such that
(a− 2bq˜r − w˜r)q˜r > pˆir − ε.
But if q˜r > qˆr and w˜r > wˆr, we have q˜r(w˜r − cs) > qˆr(wˆr − cs) and both suppliers approach
the deviating firm r. In this case, r’s profit is
p˜ir = (a− 2bq˜r − w˜r)2q˜r > 2(pˆir − ε). (A.2)
By comparing (A.1) with (A.2), we observe that p˜ir > pˆir for all ε < pˆir/2.
The proof where only the efficient supplier L’s participation constraint is satisfied is analogous.
3.A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
To the contrary, suppose that in a symmetric equilibrium Φˆr the retailers obtain zero profits,
but neither supplier’s profits are maximized subject to the retailers’ zero-profit condition. In
this case, if both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied, we have
MRSs(qˆr, wˆr) := − wˆr − cs
qˆ
6= −2b,
for s ∈ {H,L}, and, if only the efficient supplier L’s participation constraint is satisfied, we
have
MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) = − wˆr − cH
qˆ
6= −b.
If no participation constraint is satisfied, trivially, a deviating retailer could offer a sufficiently
attractive contract, which would increase its profit from zero to a positive value.
Next consider putative symmetric equilibria Φˆr where both suppliers’ participation constraints
are satisfied. Since, for all (qˆr, wˆr), MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) < MRSH(qˆr, wˆr), we can distinguish be-
tween the following three (exhaustive) cases for which MRSs(qˆr, wˆr) 6= −2b for s ∈ {H,L}.
For each case, by deriving profitable deviation strategies, we show that it cannot constitute
an equilibrium.
Case 1 : MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) ≤ MRSH(qˆr, wˆr) < −2b.
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First note that in such a case, both suppliers’ participation constraints are strictly satis-
fied. This is because, from wˆr ≤ cH follows MRSH(qˆr, wˆr) ≥ 0, which is a contradiction to
MRSH(qˆr, wˆr) < −2b.
Because both suppliers’ participation constraints are strictly satisfied, a deviating retailer r
could attract both suppliers by marginally increasing qr and adjusting (lowering) wr(qr) in a
manner that
dwr
dqr
> MRSH(qˆr, wˆr). (A.3)
In this case, r’s profit function would be
pir = (a− 2bqr − wr(qr))2qr, (A.4)
which equals pˆir = 0 at (qr, wr) = (qˆr, wˆr). The first-order effect on pir from increasing qr
would be [
dpir
dqr
]
(qr,wr)=(qˆr,wˆr)
=
(
−2b− dwrdqr
)
2qˆr. (A.5)
Since, by assumption, there exists ε > 0 such that MRSH(qˆr, wˆr) < −2b− ε, r could choose
dwr/dqr = −2b− ε, which satisfies (A.3) and renders (A.5) positive.
Case 2 : −2b < MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) ≤ MRSH(qˆr, wˆr).
Then, a deviating retailer r could attract both suppliers by marginally decreasing qr and
adjusting (increasing) wr(qr) in a manner that
dwr
d(−qr) > −MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) ⇔
dwr
dqr
< MRSL(qˆr, wˆr). (A.6)
In this case, r’s profit function would be (A.4), and the first-order effect on pir from decreasing
qr would be [
dpir
d(−qr)
]
(qr,wr)=(qˆr,wˆr)
=
(
2b+ dwrdqr
)
2qˆr. (A.7)
Since, by assumption, there exists ε > 0 such that MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) > −2b + ε, r could choose
dwr/dqr = −2b+ ε, which satisfies (A.6) and renders (A.7) positive.
Case 3 : MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) < −2b < MRSH(qˆr, wˆr).
In this case, we necessarily have ∆ > 0, and supplier L’s participation constraint is strictly
satisfied. Therefore, a deviating retailer r could attract supplier L without attracting supplier
H by marginally increasing qr and adjusting (lowering) wr(qr) in a manner that
MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) <
dwr
dqr
< MRSH(qˆr, wˆr). (A.8)
In this case, r’s profit function would be
pir = (a− bqˆr − bqr − wr(qr))qr, (A.9)
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and the first-order effect on pir from increasing qr would be[
dpir
dqr
]
(qr,wr)=(qˆr,wˆr)
=
(
−b− dwrdqr
)
qˆr. (A.10)
By assumption, dwr/dqr = −2b satisfies (A.8) and renders (A.10) positive.
Finally, we consider putative equilibria where only the efficient supplier L’s participation
constraint is satisfied, that is, wˆr < cH . In this case, whenever MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) 6= −b, there
exists a combination (q˜r, w˜r) below the zero-profit line wˆr = a− bqˆr, which is preferred by L
as compared to (qˆr, wˆr). Since wˆr < cH , the less-efficient supplier H would not be attracted
by marginal changes in (qr, wr), which leaves the zero-profit line unaffected. Thus, r can
profitably deviate in a similar manner as described above.
3.A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
If ∆ = 0, Lemma 2 requires (w∗r , q∗r ) to maximize qr(wr − c) conditional on (6). Accordingly,
we have
(q∗r , w∗r) = arg max
qr,wr
(wr − c)qr s.t. wr = a− b2qr = ((a− c)/4b, (a+ c)/2).
3.A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose there exists an equilibrium Φˆr with MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) < −2b = MRSH(qˆr, wˆr). A
deviating retailer r could attract supplier L without attracting supplier H by marginally
increasing qr and adjusting (lowering) wr(qr) in a manner that
MRSH(qˆr, wˆr) >
dwr
dqr
> MRSL(qˆr, wˆr). (A.11)
In this case, r’s profit function would be given by (A.9), and the first-order effect on pir from
increasing qr would be given by (A.10). Since, by assumption, there exists ε > 0 such that
MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) + ε < −2b, r could choose dwr/dqr = −2b − ε, which satisfies (A.11) and
renders (A.10) positive.
3.A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
First suppose that both suppliers’ participation constraints are satisfied in a symmetric equi-
librium Φˆ. From Lemmas 1 through 3 we know that in such an equilibrium
(q∗r , w∗r) = arg max
qr,wr
(wr − cL)qr s.t. wr = a− b2qr = ((a− cL)/4b, (a+ cL)/2),
pˆir = 0, pˆiL = (a− cL)2/8b, and pˆiH = (a− cL)/4b× (a+ cL − 2cH)/2. By increasing qr and
adjusting (lowering) wr such that the utility of supplier L is marginally increased, retailer r’s
offer would only be attractive for L, and H would stay with the competing retailer −r, which
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offers (qˆr, wˆr). In this case, r’s profit function would be
pir = (a− bqˆr − bqr − wr(qr))qr,
where wr(qr) is such that a marginal deviation of (qr, wr(qr)) from (qˆr, wˆr) only attracts
supplier L. The first-order effect on pir from increasing qr then would be[
dpir
dqr
]
(qr,wr)=(qˆr,wˆr)
=
(
−b− dwrdqr
)
qˆr. (A.12)
Since MRSH(qˆr, wˆr) > MRSL(qˆr, wˆr) = −2b, by choosing dwr/dqr = −2b + ε, with ε suffi-
ciently small, retailer r would attract supplier L, whereas supplier H would stay with retailer
−r, which offers (qˆr, wˆr). As a result, (A.12) would be positive, which eliminates the putative
equilibrium.
Next, consider the case where H’s participation constraint is violated in an equilibrium Φ∗r .
From Lemma 2, we know that in this case L’s profit must be maximized conditional on the
retailers’ zero-profit condition (7). Therefore, from a similar computation as in Corollary 1,
Φ∗r involves q∗r = (a − c + ∆)/2b, w∗r = (a + c − ∆)/2, pi∗r = 0, pi∗L = (a − c + ∆)2/4b, and
pi∗H = 0. As L’s profit is maximized conditional on (7), every potentially profitable deviation
Φ˜r from Φ∗r involves attracting H.
It follows from r’s profit function (5) that any deviation Φ˜r which attracts both suppliers
is only profitable if w˜r < a − 2bq˜r. Since in the proposed equilibrium pi∗L = q∗r (w∗r − cL) is
maximized conditional on w∗r ≤ a− bq∗r , no profitable Φ˜r which attracts both suppliers exists.
On the other hand, if a deviation consists of attracting H without attracting L, the profit of
the deviating retailer equals
p˜ir = (a− bq∗r − bq˜r − w˜r)q˜r.
As H’s participation constraint (w∗r ≥ cH) is violated if and only if ∆ > (a− c)/3, it follows
that q∗r > 2(a− c)/3b. Attracting supplier H further requires w˜r ≥ cH , thus we have
p˜ir <
(
a− b
[
2(a− c)
3b
]
− bq˜r − cH
)
q˜r.
By writing cH = c+ ∆, ∆ > (a− c)/3 implies
p˜ir < −bq˜2r < 0.
3.A.6 Proof of Result 1
We prove Result 1 for the case of strict dominance. For weak dominance, the proof is identical,
except that weak inequalities are replaced by strict ones.
In addition to condition (8), strict dominance requires
(a− bqs − bq−s − ws)qs > (a− 2bq−s − w−s)q−s. (A.13)
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Since (8) can be rewritten as (a− bqs − bq−s −ws)qs > (a− 2bqs − bq−s −w−s)q−s + bq2s , (8)
implies (A.13) whenever
(a− 2bqs − bq−s − w−s)q−s + bq2s > (a− 2bq−s − w−s)q−s
⇔ (qs − q−s)2 > 0.
This is true whenever qs 6= q−s. If qs = q−s, inequality (8) requires ws < w−s, which also
implies inequality (A.13).
3.A.7 Proof of Lemma 5
Any equilibrium (ΦˆH , ΦˆL) where H is chosen by the retailers requires wˆH ≥ cH , because H
could avert negative profits by offering a sufficiently unattractive contract Φ˜H .
If wˆH > cH and the retailers choose H, L could attract both retailers by offering Φ˜L with
q˜L = qˆH and w˜L = wˆH − ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small. In this case, choosing L would
be a strictly dominant strategy for both retailers, and L’s profit would increase from 0 to
(w˜L − cL)q˜L > (cH − cL)qˆH ≥ 0.
To rule out the case that the retailers choose H when wˆH = cH , recall that Assumption 3
requires
pˆir = (a− 2bqˆH − wˆH)qˆH > pˆir(L), (A.14)
where pˆir(L) denotes retailer r’s profit which could be obtained by accepting supplier L’s offer
instead. But then, H could also offer Φ˜H with q˜H = qˆH and w˜H = wˆH + ε. For sufficiently
small values of ε > 0, inequality (A.14) would remain valid, and both retailers would still
opt for supplier H. Furthermore, H’s profit would increase, which eliminates the remaining
candidate equilibrium where H is chosen by the retailers.
3.A.8 Proof of Lemma 6
Assumption 4 rules out equilibria with wˆH < cH , hence w∗H ≥ cH .
Next suppose that wˆL > cH . From Lemma 5, we know that both retailers choose supplier L,
and thus the profit of supplier H is pˆiH = 0. By offering Φ˜H with q˜H = qˆL and w˜H = wˆL − ε
with ε > 0 sufficiently small, choosing H would be a strictly dominant strategy for both
retailers. In this case, H’s profit would be p˜iH = (w˜H − cH)2q˜H = (wˆL − ε− cH)2qˆL > 0.
3.A.9 Proof of Lemma 7
As it follows from Lemma 5 that supplier H is not chosen in any equilibrium, we have
(a− 2bqˆL − wˆL)qˆL ≥ max {(a− bqˆL − bqˆH − wˆH)qˆH , 0} . (A.15)
From Result 1, (A.15) implies that it is a strictly dominant strategy for the retailers to choose
supplier L whenever (A.15) holds strictly. Then, however, L could offer Φ˜L with q˜L = qˆL and
w˜L = wˆL + ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small. In this case, inequality (A.15) would remain valid;
that is, choosing L would still be a dominant strategy for both retailers. Furthermore, L’s
profit would be higher by offering Φ˜L than by offering ΦˆL, which eliminates all (candidate)
equilibria with (a− 2bqˆL − wˆL)qL > max {(a− bqˆL − bqˆH − wˆH)qH , 0}.
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Otherwise, if (A.15) holds with equality, we distinguish between the following cases.
Case 1 : (a− bqˆL − bqˆH − wˆH)qˆH ≤ 0.
In this case, L solves
(qˆL, wˆL) = arg max
qL,wL
(wL − cL)2qL s.t. wL = a− 2bqL,
which yields qˆL = (a − cL)/4b and wˆL = (a + cL)/2. In this case, each retailer r obtains
pˆir = 0 at L.
This, however, cannot be an equilibrium if ∆ < 3(a − c)/5, because then H could attract r
and obtain a positive profit by offering Φ˜H with w˜H = cH+ε and (a−bqˆL−bq˜H−w˜H)q˜H > 0.
Therefore, the suggested equilibrium only exists for ∆ ≥ 3(a− c)/5.
Case 2 : (a− bqˆL − bqˆH − wˆH)qˆH > 0.
To show that any equilibrium with (a − bqˆL − bqˆH − wˆH)qˆH > 0 requires w∗H = w∗L = cH ,
it follows from Lemma 6 that it is sufficient to show that wˆH > wˆL cannot be part of an
equilibrium in this case.
From L’s objective function and from (A.15), in any such equilibrium, L solves
(qˆL, wˆL) = arg max
qL,wL
(wL − cL)2qL
s.t. wL = a− 2bqL − qH
qL
(a− bqL − bqH − wH), (A.16)
which yields
qˆL(qˆH) =
a− cL
4b +
qˆH
4 . (A.17)
From the constraint in (A.16), it follows that
wˆL ≥ a− 2bqˆL − max
qˆL,qˆH
{
qˆH
qˆL
(a− bqˆL − bqˆH − wˆH)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:γ1
. (A.18)
Furthermore, from the equality version of (A.15), and from the fact that in any equilibrium
the retailers obtain non-negative profits, we have
γ2 := a− bqˆL − bqˆH − wˆH ≥ 0.
Therefore,
∂γ1
∂qˆL
= − qˆH
qˆ2L
γ2 +
qˆH
qˆL
(−b) < 0. (A.19)
Now suppose that qˆH ≤ (a− cL)/3b. In this case, (A.17) implies
qˆH ≤ qˆL ≤ (a− cL)/3b. (A.20)
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Therefore, from (A.19), subject to (A.20), γ1 is maximized at qˆL = qˆH . Together with (A.18),
this yields
wˆL ≥ a− 2bqˆL − (a− 2bqˆL − wˆH) = wˆH , (A.21)
which is the required contradiction to wˆH > wˆL for the case that qˆH ≤ (a− cL)/3b.
Next, suppose that qˆH ≥ (a− cL)/3b. In this case, (A.17) implies
qˆH ≥ qˆL ≥ (a− cL)/3b. (A.22)
Therefore, from (A.19), subject to (A.22), γ1 is maximized at qˆL = (a− cL)/3b. From (A.17),
this further requires qˆH = (a − cL)/3b, and thus qˆH = qˆL. Therefore again, (A.18) implies
(A.21), which constitutes the required contradiction to wˆH > wˆL for the second case that
qˆH ≥ (a− cL)/3b.
3.A.10 Proof of Lemma 8.
First suppose that supplier L instead offers qˆL = (a − cH)/3b + δ with δ 6= 0. In this case,
H could offer Φ˜H with q˜H = (a− cH)/3b and w˜H = cH + ε. From Result 1, choosing H is a
dominant strategy for both retailers if and only if
p˜ir := (a− 2bq˜H − w˜H)q˜H > pˆir := (a− bq˜H − bqˆL − cH)qˆL
⇔ (bδ)2 > ε(a− c)/3.
Hence, by setting ε > 0 sufficiently small, H would attract both retailers, and H would obtain
a positive profit. This eliminates all equilibria with qˆL 6= (a− cH)/3b.
Next suppose that supplier H offers qˆH = (a− cL)/3b+ δ with δ 6= 0. In this case, we know
from the strict inequality versions of (A.20), (A.21), and (A.22) (see the proof of Lemma
7) that wˆL > wˆH . This, however, contradicts Lemma 7, and eliminates all equilibria with
qˆH 6= (a− cL)/3b.
Using q∗s = (a − c−s)/3b, equation (A.16) in Appendix 3.A.9 implies w∗L ≤ w∗H , where the
inequality is strict if and only if ∆ > 0. But then it follows from Lemma 7 that there is no
equilibrium for ∆ > 0.
If cH = cH = c, to show that Φ∗s with q∗s = (a− c)/3b and w∗s = c constitutes an equilibrium,
first consider potential deviations of supplier L. From the equality versions of (A.20), (A.21),
and (A.22), we know that L’s best answer to Φ∗H indeed is Φ∗L with q∗L = q∗H and w∗L = w∗H .
Regarding supplier H, first note that offering a contract with w˜H < c can never lead to a
positive profit for H. Second, if H cannot attract any retailers by offering a contract with
w˜H = c, this is also not possible with any contract with w˜H > c. If H offers Φ˜H with w˜H = c
and q˜H = (a− c)/3b+ δ with δ 6= 0, both retailers accept the offer of L, since it follows from
Result 1 that
pˆir := (a− 2bqˆL − wˆL)qˆL > p˜ir := (a− bqˆL − bq˜H − w˜H)q˜H ⇔ δ2 > 0
implies that accepting L’s offer is a dominant strategy for both retailers.
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